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[L]egal abstraction, while never socially neutral, always remains socially
volatile. Without constant reference to changing social dynamics and
consequences, students of procedure [including judges] can scarcely
1
know what they are talking about.

Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
In Memory of Ben Kaplan
INTRODUCTION
Few subjects in the field of Procedure are characterized by greater
legal abstraction than the collection of doctrines that govern the relationship between the federal and state courts. The grand experiment
by which the drafters of the Constitution “split the atom of sovereign2
ty,” as Justice Kennedy memorably put it, has not always produced readily administrable doctrines for the actual business of running parallel
and overlapping judicial systems. The Court’s efforts to harmonize the
operation of those systems through the Erie doctrine and its interpreta3
tions of the Rules Enabling Act —the statute that both authorizes and
limits the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—have been most successful
when undertaken with an informed awareness of social dynamics and
4
consequences. But successful harmonization of the judicial systems has
been the exception, not the rule.
Two related problems under the Enabling Act cry out for pragmatism informed by both knowledge of history and realism about contemporary conditions, but have languished for decades without proper
resolution. The first involves a broad interpretive question: how can
the limitations on rulemaking authority contained in the Act be applied in a manner that reflects the separation-of-powers concerns that

1

EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 257
(2000).
2
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
3
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2006).
4
See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-12 (1945) (identifying the jurisdictional policies that inform the Erie doctrine’s nonconstitutional dimensions and
clarifying the role that those policies play in limiting a diversity court’s power to craft
judge-made procedure); PURCELL, supra note 1, at 141-45, 149-55, 246-55 (discussing
Justice Brandeis’s deep concern, which contributed to his opinion in Erie and is reflected in Guaranty Trust, about the waste and unfairness that corporate defendants
created by jurisdictional manipulation designed to wear out their opponents and to
take advantage of general federal common law).
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5

animated them while also exhibiting respect for the state regulatory
arrangements that govern much of our economic and social activity?
The Supreme Court has not yet provided a useful answer to that question. Instead, it has often relied on a rigid formalism that creates perverse incentives, leading the Court to give some Federal Rules implausibly broad interpretations in order to apply federal law while emptying
others of content in order to avoid an Enabling Act challenge.
The second problem involves the intersection of the Enabling Act
with class action practice: following the 1966 amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the ascendance of the class action to a
position of central importance in the enforcement of many regulatory
policies, how can Rule 23 be squared with any reasonable account of
the Enabling Act’s prohibition against rules that abridge, enlarge, or
6
modify substantive rights? The prospect of class certification is the
single most important factor in the dynamics of litigation or settlement in any proceeding in which class treatment is on the table. Certification can transform unenforceable negative-value claims into an
industry-changing event and dramatically alter the litigation or settlement value of high-stakes individual claims. After almost half a century
of doctrinal development under modern Rule 23, the possibility that
the entire endeavor may have unfolded in violation of the Enabling
Act seems increasingly compelling, but the disruptive consequences of
such a conclusion would be unacceptable.
7
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., a closely
watched case decided in the 2009–10 Term, presented the Supreme
Court of the United States with an opportunity to speak to both issues.
Shady Grove was a federal diversity case involving a potential conflict
between a provision of New York law that prohibits the award of penalties or statutory damages on a classwide basis unless expressly author8
ized, and Federal Rule 23, which broadly authorizes federal courts to

5

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1106-12 (1982) (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act’s procedure/substance dichotomy was not designed primarily to safeguard state law, but rather to limit the prospective lawmaking power the Act granted to the Supreme Court and thereby maintain the
separation of powers).
6
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (stating that procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right”).
7
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
8
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute . . . specifically authorizes the recovery [of a penalty or statutory damages] in a class action, an action to
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may
not be maintained as a class action.”).

BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2010 10:59 AM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

20

[Vol. 159: 17
9

certify, manage, and hear class action proceedings. Sadly, the case
shed little light. In a fractured opinion written for a divided Court,
Justice Scalia held that Rule 23 displaced New York’s law on the issue
of classwide penalty liability. In the portion of his opinion that spoke
for a majority, Justice Scalia offered an interpretation of Rule 23 that
10
found a conflict with New York law where none need exist. And
when speaking for a plurality, he provided an account of federal and
state policies on aggregate litigation that ignored the practical realities
of the modern class action and the animating impulses behind it, an account that more accurately reflects class action practice in 1938 than in
11
2010. There are some valid insights in the plurality opinion dealing
with the proper interpretive approach to the Enabling Act, but they are
eclipsed by oversimplification and overwhelmed by the tide of confusion that characterizes the rest of the opinion. Shady Grove called for a
restrained and enlightened interpretation of both the Enabling Act and
Rule 23, but the Justices did not deliver.
This Article seeks to redeem the missed opportunities of Shady
Grove and provide the clarifying accounts of the Enabling Act and
Rule 23 that the opinions fail to offer. After a brief overview of the
Shady Grove dispute in Part I, Part II addresses the proper interpretive
12
approach to the Rules Enabling Act. Building upon past work, we
identify the need for a more dynamic approach to the text of Federal
Rules than the Court has exhibited—one that recognizes the indeterminacy inherent in prospective rulemaking, the role of federal
common law in the interpretation of the Rules, and the role of the
Rules in federal common law—and the need to revisit the line between “procedure” and “substance” in light of practical experience
and evolving legal norms.

9

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-42 (determining that Rule 23 was in conflict with
section 901(b) and thus that, if valid, Rule 23 must govern in federal diversity suits).
11
See id. at 1442-44 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (explaining that Rule 23 “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims
of multiple parties at once . . . [and that] like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’
legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged”).
12
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 [hereinafter
Burbank, Hold the Corks]; Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith
and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986)
[hereinafter Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion]; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules and Discretion]; Burbank, supra note 5.
10
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Part III then turns to the status of class action litigation under the
Enabling Act. We regard Shady Grove as the occasion for a shift in understanding of the sources and content of aggregation policy. Although some may view the reorientation we propose as radical, it has
deep roots in the history of the class action and its treatment under
Rule 23, and it is consistent with much existing class action practice.
The solution to the seeming dilemma caused by Rule 23’s dramatic
impact upon substantive liability and regulatory regimes is that
Rule 23 is not the source of the aggregate-liability policies that generate that impact, and it never has been. Rather, courts must look to
the substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and federal law
in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and consistent
with the goals of that underlying law. Rule 23 is merely the mechanism
for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect when the underlying
law supports that result. It is an important mechanism, and one that
makes its own controlling policy choices for the federal courts about
such matters as notice, opportunity to opt out, and immediate appeal of
certification. But Rule 23 does not set policy on the propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of accomplishing regulatory goals—and it
13
could not possibly do so. In the dispute that produced Shady Grove,
section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules set liability
policy under New York law. The Court did violence to the Enabling Act
when it concluded that Rule 23 could supersede that policy.
I.

THE SHADY GROVE DISPUTE

Shady Grove arose out of a dispute between Allstate Insurance and
Shady Grove Orthopedic concerning payments due under a no-fault

13

Justice Powell foreshadowed some aspects of our analysis in his incisive dissent
in the Roper case:
The Court argues that the result will be to deny compensation to putative class
members and jeopardize the enforcement of certain legal rights by “private [attorneys] general.” The practical argument is not without force. But predicating
a judgment on these concerns amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to
the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best left to Congress. At the very least,
the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of usury claims, the Court’s concern for
compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling Act.
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 354-55 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
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14

insurance scheme. Shady Grove had provided medical treatment to
an injured individual who was covered by no-fault automobile insur15
ance as required by New York law. After the individual assigned all
her payment rights to Shady Grove, the company sought reimburse16
ment directly from Allstate. Allstate eventually paid, but not within
17
the thirty-day period that was required for uncontested claims. New
York law imposes two percent monthly interest on late payments under
the no-fault insurance scheme, a penalty that totaled around five hun18
dred dollars in this instance.
On the basis of this claim, Shady Grove became the named plaintiff
in a putative class action filed against Allstate in federal court under the
19
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The suit alleged that Allstate regularly failed to make uncontested payments within the required thirtyday period, and that even after rendering payment for covered services
it consistently failed to pay the two-percent monthly penalty required
20
under New York law, or otherwise acted in bad faith in seeking to
21
avoid that penalty. Plaintiff sought certification of a class to prosecute
these claims on behalf of all insurance beneficiaries or their assignees
22
whose rights Allstate had allegedly violated in this fashion.
New York law includes a provision specifically addressing the
availability of statutory-penalty or minimum-damage remedies in a
class proceeding, which was enacted when New York updated its general class action provision following the 1966 amendments to Federal
23
Rule 23. In section 901(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules, New York adopted general requirements for certification of a
class action that broadly parallel the requirements of its federal coun24
terpart. Section 901(b) further specified as follows: “Unless a statute
creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery
14

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (majority opinion).
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1436-37; see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009) (“All overdue
payments shall bear interest at the rate of two percent per month.”).
19
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
20
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
21
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
22
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
23
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1549 (2008) (illustrating through an appendix state adoptions of Rule 23 as amended in 1966).
24
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2006).
15
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specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or im25
posed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” Section
901(b) thus creates a default rule against the availability of classwide statutory penalties under New York law, requiring express authorization if
classwide relief is to be available. Since the New York no-fault insurance
laws do not include such authorization, section 901(b) prohibits the
award of the two-percent late-payment penalty on a classwide basis.
Shady Grove presented the question whether a federal court sitting
in diversity should apply section 901(b) and deny the classwide remedy
as a state court would. The district court and the Second Circuit both
concluded that section 901(b) was indeed binding upon the federal
courts and that Federal Rule 23 did not purport to displace that provi26
sion, a conclusion that earlier district court opinions had shared al27
most uniformly. But the Supreme Court disagreed.
Speaking for a majority on this point only, Justice Scalia held that
28
Rule 23 and section 901(b) unavoidably collide.
Rule 23(a), he
pointed out, “states that ‘[a] class action may be maintained’ if two
conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) . . . and it also must fit into one of the three categories de29
Concluding that the Rule “creates a
scribed in subdivision (b).”
categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified crite30
ria to pursue his claim as a class action,” the majority found that this

25

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467,
471-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that section 901(b) barred a class action in this case),
aff’d, 549 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
27
See, e.g., Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
that there was “no collision” between Rule 23 and section 901(b) because Rule 23
merely establishes procedure for pursuing class actions, while section 901(b) prohibits
that mechanism for certain types of litigation); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating
Corp., 201 F.R.D 81, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that any plaintiffs wanting to preserve
their right to recover liquidated damages would have to opt out of the class because of
section 901(b)); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 182 F.R.D. 72, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(certifying a class under Rule 23 but severing a claim that arose under a statute providing for a specific penalty, holding that “[w]hereas this Court is bound by Fed.R.Civ.P.
23 in this action, the strictures of New York’s CPLR § 901(b) do not contravene any
federal rule”). But see Wesley v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 117, 119-20
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (assuming in dictum that statutory penalties would be recoverable in a
class action but dismissing the state law claim on other grounds).
28
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438-42
(2010).
29
Id. at 1437 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
30
Id.
26
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supposed mandate conflicted with New York law, which uses bewitchingly parallel language in specifying that, except when specifically
authorized, “an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class
31
action.”
This conclusion necessitated an analysis of Rule 23’s validity under
the Enabling Act. Following the Court’s precedents, the “direct collision” between the two provisions required the application of the Federal Rule unless that result would violate the Act’s limitations on inter32
ference with substantive rights (or the Constitution). Speaking for a
plurality of four, Justice Scalia found it “obvious that rules allowing
multiple claims (and claims by or against multiple parties) to be litigated together” are valid under the Enabling Act, since joinder rules
“neither change plaintiffs’ separate entitlements to relief nor abridge
33
defendants’ rights; they alter only how the claims are processed.” Any
impact that the availability of classwide relief might have on the levels
at which a penalty provision can be enforced, including the danger of
overenforcement—as one New York commentary put it, the threat of
34
“‘annihilating punishment’” —was, in the plurality’s view, merely an
“‘incidental effect[]’” that did not call into question the validity of
35
Rule 23 or the propriety of the majority’s broad reading of that rule.
Justice Stevens concurred separately, providing the fifth vote for
the majority’s Rule 23 holding but rejecting the plurality’s strong
36
embrace of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. in explaining that result under
37
the Enabling Act. Justice Ginsburg authored a four-Justice dissent
that, among other things, offered a different account of the proper

31

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added); see also Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1438-39 (emphasizing the parallel language in the two provisions).
32
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“[T]he court has been instructed
to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question
transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”).
33
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J.,
and Sotomayor, J.).
34
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901, cmt. C901:11 (quoting Ratner v. Chem. Bank of N.Y., 54
F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
35
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444.
36
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
37
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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38

interpretive approach to Rule 23, one with which Justice Stevens
39
agreed in some respects.
When the dust settled at the end of the opinions, little was
resolved. The proper interpretive approach to the Enabling Act remains an open question. We take up that question in the next Part.
Only the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23—at once sweeping in scope
and utterly barren in its account of the Rule’s practical impact on the
regulation of economic and social activity—had the backing of a majority. And, as we explain in Part III, the majority’s analysis was so
divorced from reality that Shady Grove will likely stand for little more
than the bare holding that Rule 23 does not on its face violate the
Enabling Act. With that proposition, at least, we can agree.
II. SHADY GROVE AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT:
40
MISSING THE FOREST AND THE TREES
Although we have chosen to treat in separate sections Shady
Grove’s Enabling Act analysis and the interpretation of the Federal
Rules, the two are linked; courts have responded to the inadequacies
of doctrine in the former domain by exercising restraint in the latter.
These inadequacies include the Court’s persistent failure, starting
with Sibbach, to acknowledge separation of powers as the primary purpose of the Enabling Act’s allocation of lawmaking power. Although
perhaps initially stimulated by the desire to augment its rulemaking
power, the Court’s erroneous invocation of federalism as the animating goal of the Enabling Act’s procedure/substance dichotomy ensnared
the Federal Rules in the confused jurisprudence that followed Erie
41
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, providing one incentive for restrained interpretation. The Court eventually cleaned up part of the mess with
42
Hanna v. Plumer by making clear that the allocation of lawmaking
38

See id. at 1465-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent).
40
We have employed this metaphor in the past:
39

In more than one part of the opinion in Ortiz, as in Amchem, the Court expressed solicitude for the limitations on court rulemaking imposed by the
Rules Enabling Act. Consistently with its previous misreadings of that statute,
however, the Court missed the forest of separation of powers for the trees of
federalism.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR ZIVILPROZEß INTERNATIONAL 321, 335 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
41
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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power between the federal government and the States depends on the
source of federal lawmaking power. Even so, the Court did nothing to
call into question Sibbach’s misdirected and wooden approach to the
Enabling Act, thus providing a different incentive for restrained interpretation of the Federal Rules.
Whether prompted by concern about consistency with prevailing
Erie jurisprudence or by implicit acknowledgment that Sibbach is
hopeless, the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Federal Rules, although often restrained, has rarely been enlightened. That is not a
surprise, since enlightened interpretation must be informed by attention to purpose, and the Court has never been willing to focus on
the Act’s purpose to safeguard the separation of powers—the respective policy spheres of Congress as lawmaker and the Supreme Court
in its dual role as rulemaker and expositor of federal common law—
let alone to grapple with the implications of that focus for the interpretive enterprise.
Our discussion of Shady Grove’s Enabling Act analysis requires that
we review the course of the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting that
statute. Doing so lays bare the tensions that have flowed from the
erroneous choice, at the start, to privilege federalism over separation
of powers, and the attendant consequences that have flowed from the
Court’s attempts to avoid undesirable consequences through restrained interpretation of Federal Rules—attempts undertaken without a coherent interpretive framework. An enlightened and restrained interpretation, we argue, requires attention to the actual policy
choices that Federal Rules make and that Congress had an opportunity
to review, and if necessary reject. By this route, the federal courts would
honor the Enabling Act’s purpose to affirm the separation of powers
through a limited delegation of prospective lawmaking power, along
with the process for congressional review of proposed Federal Rules
that has been part of the statute since the beginning. It would also
honor Hanna’s federalism purpose to distinguish between sources of
federal lawmaking power when considering state law prerogatives.
Our approach may reduce the domain of some Federal Rules,
because it calls for careful attention to the role of federal common law
as a necessary supplement to the Rules’ open-ended text in identifying
the source and content of litigation policies in the federal courts.
Sometimes, federal common law will be required to implement federal interests reflected in valid federal law, including the Rules themselves. Where this is so, state law will be displaced. Sometimes, however, the federal common law analysis will fail to unearth interests that
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are demonstrably rooted in existing federal law. In the latter class of
cases, the limitations on federal common law in diversity litigation will
often require that state law control the analysis because no valid federal interests requiring protection exist to displace it. This interpretive approach should change the perverse incentive structure that has
contributed to the chaotic state of current law.
A. False Start
43

It is easy to forget that Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. —the 1941 decision
in which the Court first entertained a challenge to a Federal Rule under the Enabling Act—was, on that question, a 5-4 decision. It is even
easier to forget—or even to overlook—that although the Court attributed the procedure/substance dichotomy in the first two sentences
of the Act to concerns about the allocation of lawmaking power be44
tween the federal government and the States, Justice Frankfurter’s
opinion for the four Justices in the minority discerned correctly that
the animating concern of the Act was separation of powers.
As Frankfurter pointed out, the Enabling Act authorizes prospective supervisory court rules for all civil actions in federal district
45
court, including cases governed by federal substantive law in which
any concern about the allocation of lawmaking power relates exclu46
If concerns about federalism drove the
sively to “national law.”
Enabling Act’s allocation scheme, either its standards would have to
do double duty—implementing limitations in federal question cases
that were not informed by the relevant structural considerations—or
the Act would impose no restrictions on prospective supervisory court
rulemaking with respect to federal substantive rights. Neither option
is analytically coherent. The separation-of-powers account is further

43

312 U.S. 1 (1941).
See id. at 9-10 (contrasting Congress’s power to regulate “procedure of federal
courts” with its lack of authority to declare or abolish “substantive state law”); Burbank,
supra note 5, at 1029-30 n.60 (“The link between the constitutional and statutory allocation of federal and state power and the scope of the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act is made clear in the paragraph [in Sibbach] following that suggesting limits on
congressional power . . . .”).
45
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But Rule 35 applies to
all civil litigation in the federal courts, and thus concerns the enforcement of federal
rights and not merely of state law in the federal courts.”).
46
See id. at 18 (“So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to
privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the
more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts.”).
44
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strengthened by the fact that the Enabling Act became law in 1934,
four years before Erie put an end to the infringements on state lawmaking prerogatives under the general federal common law that Swift
47
v. Tyson authorized. Moreover, in 1934, federal question cases dom48
inated the civil docket of the federal courts. The view that separation-of-powers concerns were the impetus for the Enabling Act’s limitations on rulemaking becomes well-nigh impregnable when one also
considers that, although the 1934 legislative history of the Enabling
Act is both very short and not at all illuminating on this or any other
question of consequence, the separation-of-powers account is confirmed in the detailed and very illuminating legislative history of court
rulemaking bills that the Senate considered in the 1920s, including
committee reports on a bill that, with the exception of one word, was
49
identical to the statute enacted in 1934.
We do not know why the Sibbach Court ignored such powerful evidence that separation of powers, rather than federalism, animated the
Enabling Act’s limitations on rulemaking by the Supreme Court. Perhaps it was the influence of Erie, which was decided the same year the
Federal Rules became effective and three years before Sibbach, and

47

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
48
See AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS pt. 2, at
53-57 (1934) (providing detailed statistics on the number of diversity and federal question cases that were terminated in federal district courts between June 1929 and June
1930); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1936, exhibit 2, at 162, 177-79 (displaying the assortment
and number of federal question cases that were tried in district courts in fiscal year
1936); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 619 (2004)
(explaining that the original Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules was aware that
the “litigation landscape” was not “dominated by simple diversity cases”); cf. Burbank,
supra note 5, at 1109-10 (discussing the lack of concern for preservation of state law
when the Rules Enabling Act was formulated and passed).
49
See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1050-98. The research that explored this legislative history also unearthed a 1923 letter from the author of the relevant section of the
bill, Senator Albert Cummins, to Chief Justice Taft in which Cummins requested that
Taft “particularly note the sentence reading: ‘Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.’” Letter from Sen. Albert B.
Cummins to Hon. William H. Taft, reprinted in Burbank, supra note 5, at 1073 n.260.
Cummins continued,
I hope you will not think that I overlooked the obvious principle that Congress could not if it wanted to, confer upon the Supreme Court, legislative
power. I have suggested this sentence solely to quiet the apprehensions of
those who may be opposed to any measure of this sort.
Id.
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50

which became a “brooding omnipresence” that for years assumed
extraconstitutional influence. That does not seem a wholly satisfactory explanation, however, given that the relevant legislative history had
51
been brought to the Court’s attention and that four Justices grasped
the inadequacy of the federalism account. Moreover, since the limitations, correctly understood, protect against inappropriate prospective
federal lawmaking by the Supreme Court, they also serve to protect
state interests (albeit in a derivative fashion) by preserving for Congress, and hence to legislators representing the States, the decision
whether to enact prospective federal law on matters that exceed those
limitations. If Congress chooses not to make federal law, then state
law governs unless displaced by valid federal common law.
More likely, the majority in Sibbach believed that linking the
Enabling Act’s allocation scheme to federalism constraints with respect to substantive law—constraints that, under Erie, the Constitution
was thought to impose on Congress and that the Rules of Decision
52
53
Act does impose on the federal courts —would maximize the
Court’s rulemaking power and ensure the integrity of the recently
promulgated Federal Rules. More generally, the federal judiciary
would be able to regulate the broad landscape that the Sibbach majority’s author had advocated as appropriate for judicial control before he
54
joined the Court, rather than the narrower landscape that reformers
in New York had advocated in work on which proponents of the

50

S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of
some sovereign . . . .”); Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946). For evidence of the “immediate impact of Erie in muddying the waters,” see Burbank, supra note 5, at 1110-11 n.435.
51
See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1180 (noting that Mrs. Sibbach’s attorney “drew
the Court’s attention to the support for her functional argument, and some of its implementing abstractions, in . . . the 1926 Senate Report”).
52
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
53
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); sources cited supra note 44
(describing the Court’s linking of the Act to principles of federalism).
54
See Owen J. Roberts, Trial Procedure—Past, Present and Future, 15 A.B.A. J. 667, 668
(1929) (arguing that the regulation of procedure should not be left in the care of the
legislature but rather should “be in the hands of those who know best about it and
who . . . can make rules to meet situations as they arise in the actual practice of law”),
quoted in Burbank, supra note 5, at 1031 n.65; see also Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (“[T]he new
policy envisaged in the enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court procedure
be regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth.”).
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Enabling Act relied at various points in its long pre-1934 legislative
55
history, including in a key Senate Judiciary Committee Report.
On this view, a federalism account facilitated the monolithic formalism that suffuses the Court’s opinion in Sibbach, painting a landscape in which there is only procedure and substantive law, with noth56
ing in between. Whether or not this move reflected the jurispruden57
tial beliefs of the majority, it was a useful tool to reach a desired result. The plurality opinion in Shady Grove illustrates that the tool still
has its uses, even in the hands of Justices who are conversant with the
lessons of legal realism and the significant changes in thought concerning the relationship between procedure and substantive law—in
particular, the growing awareness that in “procedure” lurks power to
alter or mask substantive results—that have occurred in the ensuing
seventy years. That is reason enough to regret the plurality opinion.
It becomes cause for remonstrance when one realizes that these Justices manifested awareness of the shortcomings of Sibbach’s interpreta58
tion of the Enabling Act but chose neither to repudiate that inter55

See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1055-61, 1087-88, 1125-27 (discussing the limitations on court rulemaking emphasized by the New York Reports and the extent to
which House and Senate committees relied on them prior to 1934). That those primarily responsible for explaining the bills that preceded the Enabling Act drew heavily
on these New York sources is additional evidence that federalism was not their primary
concern. It also imparts an additional layer of irony to the decision in Shady Grove.
56
See id. at 1028-31.
The references by the Court to “rights conferred by law to be protected and
enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judicial procedure” and to
procedure as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law” strongly suggested that the Rules Enabling Act divided the
legal universe into two parts: rules of decision found within areas, such as
contracts, tort, and property, that would be deemed purely substantive by anyone’s definition, and all other rules, which would be considered procedural,
even if they had some effect on the enforcement of pure substantive rules.
Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington
Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1987).
57
Justice Roberts was joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds,
Stone, and Reed. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6, 19. For recent work challenging the traditional account of judicial behavior that sees a clear divide between formalism and realism, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010).
58
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445-46
(2010) (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.).
In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach, but to overrule it (or,
what is the same, to rewrite it). [Sibbach’s] approach, the concurrence insists,
gives short shrift to the statutory text forbidding the Federal Rules from “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.” There is something to that. It is possible to understand how it can be determined whether a
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pretation nor to use other tools that the Court had previously, albeit
inconsistently, employed to minimize the damage.
B. Damage Control: From Too Little to Too Much Power in the Federal Rules
Prior to Shady Grove the Court minimized the damage of Sibbach’s
wooden and, at least in its federalism orientation, demonstrably erroneous interpretation of the Enabling Act primarily by interpreting
Federal Rules not to govern the matter in issue. In the beginning,
that approach was straightforward and unexceptionable, as in Palmer
v. Hoffman, where the Court clearly and correctly held that Rule 8(c)
governs only the burden of pleading and does not speak to the burden
59
of persuasion. As time passed, the approach was less straightforward
and, as a result, more easily contested. For example, in the Ragan case,
the Court seemed to abjure interpreting Rule 3 to specify a rule for tolling a state statute of limitations because of concern that Erie forbade
60
that result. As a result of Ragan and some other cases, the baggage of
Erie’s “brooding omnipresence,” which Sibbach carried, seemed to
61
threaten the integrity of the Federal Rules. That threat prompted the
Court’s unsuccessful attempt to clarify the relationship between federal
62
and state law in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., fol63
lowed by its renewed, more successful attempt in Hanna.

Federal Rule “enlarges” substantive rights without consulting State law: If the
Rule creates a substantive right, even one that duplicates some state-created
rights, it establishes a new federal right. But it is hard to understand how it can
be determined whether a Federal Rule “abridges” or “modifies” substantive
rights without knowing what state-created rights would obtain if the Federal
Rule did not exist. Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—
driven by the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to
State would be chaos—is hard to square with § 2072(b)’s terms.
Id.
59

318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (“Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading. The
question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law
which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.” (citation omitted)).
60
See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949)
(“We cannot give [this suit] longer life in the federal court than it would have had in
the state court without adding something to the cause of action.”); Whitten, supra note
56, at 9-10 (“One cannot read the Ragan opinion without drawing the conclusion that
the Court viewed the case as one in which a Federal Rule conflicted with state law, and
in which Erie thus required application of the state provision.” (footnote omitted)).
61
See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1032 (stating that cases interpreting the Rules in
relation to Erie “raised fears for the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”
(footnote omitted)).
62
See 356 U.S. 525, 534-40 (1958) (explaining that because the state rule was not
“intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the par-
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As Professor Ely acknowledged in his exegetical mea culpa on
Hanna, by relying on Sibbach the Court again failed to clarify whether
and how the Enabling Act’s limitations on the Court’s power to
promulgate prospective supervisory court rules differ from the Consti64
tution’s limitations on Congress. That failure may help to explain
why, in his much-noted concurring opinion, Justice Harlan elided the
limitations of the Constitution and the Enabling Act. While expressing
admiration for the Court’s attempt to prevent the frustration of valid
federal law under the cloud of the Court’s prior Erie jurisprudence, Justice Harlan expressed concern that it had moved “too fast and far in the
65
other direction,” effectively insulating the Federal Rules from challenge for improperly infringing on state lawmaking prerogatives.
C. Sibbach’s Inadequacies Revealed
Hanna’s clear distinction between the power that resides in the
Federal Rules to override state lawmaking choices and the more qualified power of federal judge-made law to do the same yielded radically
different tests for the validity of those two forms of federal lawmaking.

ties,” and because there was a strong federal policy concerning the allocation of power
between judge and jury, the “policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and
obligations” did not require application of the state rule). As we discuss below, Byrd’s
“affirmative countervailing considerations,” id. at 537, if properly disciplined, can inform a more robust form of federal common law than has developed in the wake of
Hanna. The Byrd Court did not discipline that concept, perhaps because the influence
of the Seventh Amendment seemed so clear and also because the Court had not yet
grasped Hanna’s central insight about the relevance of different sources of federal
lawmaking power. See id. at 537-38 & n.12 (citing Sibbach for the proposition that
“[t]he policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations cannot in
every case exact compliance with a state rule”).
63
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-74 (1965) (clarifying the intersection between the Federal Rules and state laws); see also Whitten, supra note 56, at 12 (“A more
complete salvation for the Rules had to await the Court’s decision in Hanna . . . .”).
64
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (1974)
(“By essentially obliterating the Enabling Act in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. in 1941, [the
Court] created a need for limits on the Rules, a need it subsequently filled not by reconsidering Sibbach, but rather by an undefended application of the Erie line of precedents. . . . All that should have changed in 1965, however, with the decision in Hanna . . . .”); see also id. at 720 (“[T]he text of the opinion did little more, so far as the
interpretation of the Enabling Act was concerned, than point to Sibbach.”); id. at 693
(noting that Professor Ely was a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren during the term that
Warren authored the Court’s opinion in Hanna).
65
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (cautioning against “setting up the
Federal Rules as a body of law inviolate”). Thus, both the majority and, to the extent that
he had the Enabling Act in mind, Justice Harlan perpetuated Sibbach’s myth that federalism, rather than separation-of-powers, concerns animate the Enabling Act’s limitations.
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As a result, the Court’s incentive to give Federal Rules a restrained interpretation shifted from the cloud of Erie’s “brooding omnipresence”
to the cloud of Sibbach’s ever-more-evident inadequacy. Putting aside
the concerns that in fact animated the Enabling Act’s limitations and
66
the goal of the Sibbach Court not to invite “endless litigation” about
the new Federal Rules, the interpretation of “substantive rights” as
confined to “rights conferred by law to be protected and enforced in
67
accordance with the adjective law of judicial procedure” was increasingly out of touch with the way in which law was made and applied in
the United States. So too was the notion that prospective supervisory
court rules may displace the policy choices of lawmakers (federal or
state) as long as they “really regulate[] procedure—the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or in68
fraction of them.”
The 1960s and 1970s brought broad recognition of the inability of
traditional two-party litigation, which depends upon the traditional
market for legal services, to provide adequate enforcement of statutes
designed to cure the imperfections of the common law, provide equal
economic opportunity, or otherwise implement important social
norms. Inclined to rely on litigation in place of, or in addition to,
centralized administrative enforcement, lawmakers employed a variety
of techniques—in addition to new liability rules—to stimulate private
enforcement. These techniques included multiple (e.g., treble) or
punitive damages, statutory damages, attorney-fee shifting, and, as we
shall discuss in Part III concerning New York law, class actions. Although these techniques for stimulating private enforcement were not
69
new, their incidence increased enormously in the period in question.
66

See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right [for the definition of “substantive rights”], we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded.”).
67
Id. at 13.
68
Id. at 14.
69
See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (“Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by
providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.”); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-80 (1986) (reasoning that Congress granted attorneys’ fees under § 1988 because of the public benefit created by civil rights litigation);
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) (positing that the incentives class actions provide to lawyers are “a natural outgrowth of the increasing reliance on the ‘private attorney general’ for the vindication of legal rights”); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-03 (1968) (explaining that attorneys’ fees
are necessary in Title II cases to encourage those injured by racial discrimination to
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The disconnect between Sibbach’s incomplete and dichotomous vision of the legal landscape and emerging legislative views about private enforcement was made obvious by the controversy that greeted
the application of Rule 68 (Offer of Judgment) to cases governed by a
federal fee-shifting statute and successive proposals to amend Rule 68
in the early 1980s. Although the Court simply ignored the Enabling
Act question that the operation of the existing version of Rule 68
70
posed, the proposals to amend it attracted vigorous and very public
opposition. The first such proposal would have authorized the federal
courts to displace legislative policy choices concerning attorney-fee
shifting in federal question cases under the Civil Rights Acts, choices
that Congress deemed essential to the adequate enforcement of those

seek judicial relief); Davis v. Werne, 673 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1982) (clarifying that
statutory damages are available under the Truth-in-Lending Act to encourage “private
attorneys general” to aid in its enforcement).
For a rich and fascinating study of private enforcement of federal statutes that uses
both econometric techniques and detailed historical analysis to test the author’s hypotheses, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010). As Farhang documents, although Congress’s use of proplaintiff fee shifting or multiple or punitive damages (or both) to stimulate private enforcement began in the second half of the nineteenth century, it exploded in the late
1960s and the 1970s. See, e.g., id. at 66 fig. 3.1. The author was kind enough to provide us
with his database of federal statutes containing such enforcement tools. According to
our tally, although only three federal statutes contained such provisions from 1887 to
1899, and only twenty-six did so between 1900 and 1959, ten statutes contained one or
both in the period from 1964 to 1969, and sixty did so in statutes enacted between 1970
and 1979. Farhang shows that, contrary to one hypothesis, the preference for litigation
over administrative enforcement has not always been confined to Democrats—indeed,
Republicans were responsible for that choice in the Civil Rights Act of 1964—but that in
periods of divided government, the preference for litigation consistently has reflected
concern about over- or underenforcement if the administrative enforcement option were
pursued (because an ideologically distant executive could subvert congressional preferences). See id. at 76-78, 81, 127.
70
See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). The Court may have done so because
Justice Brennan’s dissent (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) made it clear
that engaging that question would require repudiation of Sibbach’s federalism account.
See id. at 35-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of
Rule 68 was inconsistent with § 1988). Although taking a different view of the merits
than did the dissenters, the Solicitor General’s amicus brief also alerted the Court to
Sibbach’s inadequacies, citing both the 1926 Senate Report and the research that established the historical support for a separation-of-powers account of the Enabling Act’s
limitations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (No. 83-1437), 1984 WL 565432, at *25 n.19 (“The
legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act supports [the separation-of-powers] construction of section 2072.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to
Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425, 433 n.42 (1986) (suggesting that if the
Court had addressed the Enabling Act issue in Marek, it might have had to reformulate
its interpretation of the Act).
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statutes. The second, albeit less obviously (because under the cloak of
the sanctions label) and less intrusively, would nonetheless have authorized some displacement of congressional policy choices designed
71
to stimulate private enforcement. Both attracted attention and adverse comment in Congress and were influential in an ultimately un72
successful attempt to prompt the Court to abandon Sibbach.
D. The Court’s Incoherent Jurisprudence of Scope
Hanna’s reconfiguration of the Erie doctrine, while solving some
problems, left the federal courts ill-equipped to interpret the scope of
the Federal Rules during the very period when the potential impact of
those Rules on important questions of liability and regulatory policy
was becoming clear. In this respect, the Court had only itself to blame
for the belief of some litigants and lower courts that Hanna had over73
ruled Ragan. For, ironically in light of Justice Scalia’s responses to
74
the concurring and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove, the Hanna
Court manufactured a “direct collision” by dissecting a Massachusetts
statute that prescribed service of process as a means to toll its limitations period and misrepresenting the statute’s paragraphs as designed
75
to address limitations and service separately. Presumably, the Court
granted review in Walker to dispel the confusion for which it was re71

See Burbank, supra note 70, at 426-30, 435-39 (discussing proposed amendments
to Rule 68 and their effect on congressional policy choices); see also Marek, 473 U.S. at
38-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing an overview of discussions regarding
amendments to Rule 68).
72
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 13 (1985) (discussing the criticism of the 1983 and
1984 proposals to amend Rule 68); Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1031-33
(discussing the House Judiciary Committee Report on the bill that subsequently served
as the cornerstone of the 1988 amendments); Burbank, supra note 70, at 438-40
(highlighting continued debates regarding the amendment of Rule 68).
73
See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 n.8 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Harlan
in his concurring opinion in Hanna concluded that Ragan was no longer good law.”).
74
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440
(2010) (“But even accepting the dissent’s account of the Legislature’s objective at face
value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.”); id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., for himself,
Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (“[Sibbach] leaves no room for special exemptions based
on the function or purpose of a particular state rule.”).
75
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n.1; Burbank, supra note 5, at 1174
(“The court of appeals’ gloss confirms what a fair reading of the statute as a whole suggests, namely that the statutory provisions in question were the functional equivalent of a
tolling rule.”); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The evident intent of the statute is to permit an executor to distribute the estate which he is administering without fear that further liabilities may be outstanding for which he could be held
personally liable.”). This helps to explain why Justice Harlan thought that Hanna was
indistinguishable from Ragan and that the latter should be overruled. See id. at 476-78.
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sponsible. No longer saddled with Erie jurisprudence that cast the validity of Rule 3 in doubt, but saddled instead with Hanna’s retrospec76
tive explanation of Ragan as a reading of Rule 3, the Justices sought
to clarify the circumstances in which Hanna’s test for the validity of a
Federal Rule, which is virtually impossible to fail, and its test (in dictum) for the validity of judge-made federal law, which is very hard to
satisfy, would apply. Unfortunately, the effort clarified nothing.
The Walker Court observed that Hanna’s Federal Rule analysis applies only if “the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad
77
to control the issue before the Court,” but it cautioned that courts
should not narrowly construe Federal Rules “in order to avoid a ‘di78
rect collision’” when their “plain meaning” required otherwise. Like
the majority opinion in Shady Grove, the Walker Court’s subsequent
reasoning fortifies skepticism about the general utility of “plain meaning” interpretation. Rather than resting on the language of the Rule,
the Court adduced the Advisory Committee Note and then read that
79
Note tendentiously when it concluded that “[t]here is no indication
80
that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations.”
Moreover, the Court addressed the policies underlying state law before concluding that “Rule 3 does not replace such policy determina81
tions found in state law,” not explaining how the plain meaning of
Rule 3 could depend upon the content of state law. Finally and incredibly, when the Court confronted the operation of Rule 3 in a federal question case in West v. Conrail, it discovered a “plain meaning”
82
that was altogether different.
76

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12 (citing Ragan as a case in which the Court
found “the scope of [a] Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged” so
“Erie commanded the enforcement of state law”); Whitten, supra note 56, at 13 (explaining that Hanna reinterpreted Ragan).
77
Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
78
Id. at 750 n.9.
79
See id. at 750 n.10 (“[The Note] does not indicate . . . that Rule 3 was intended to
serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests that the
Advisory Committee thought that the Rule might have that effect.”). “In fact, it is possible to infer from the published sources that the Advisory Committee intended Rule 3
to have a tolling effect, if that were within the Court’s power under the Act.” Burbank,
supra note 5, at 1159 n.620.
80
Walker, 446 U.S. at 750.
81
Id. at 751-52.
82
See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (“[W]hen the underlying cause of
action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in compliance with Rule 3 within the
borrowed period.”).
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Lurking beneath the surface of Walker, there may have been an
awareness that even though Sibbach’s “test” for the validity of a Federal
Rule under the Enabling Act could have supported a reading of
Rule 3 that included a tolling function, categorical choices as to both
the period of limitations and the event that tolls that period have a
predictable and direct effect on rights under the substantive law (federal or state). By determining whether those rights subsist, policy
choices about tolling and the limitations period thus abridge, enlarge,
83
or modify substantive rights. Lurking beneath the surface of West, on
the other hand, may have been the view that the Enabling Act imposes
no limitations in federal question cases, which seems unlikely if only
because unthinkable. Alternatively, perhaps the West Court believed
that Federal Rules are insulated against challenge under the Enabling
Act when they incorporate or reflect rules that federal courts validly
have fashioned or could fashion as federal common law—a more sub84
tle approach, but one for which there is no evidence in the opinion.
In an interpretive landscape where “direct collisions” are manufactured, the same language has multiple “plain meanings,” and the
governing precedent (Sibbach) is hopelessly out of step with legal developments, it is no surprise that, since Walker, the Justices have
lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some Federal Rules a
scope of application broader than appears plausible—certainly,
broader than necessary to escape a charge of infidelity to the text—
while emptying others of content. We strongly suspect that the unifying characteristic of these decisions has been an awareness that, although Hanna cleaned up some of the mess engendered (or facilitated) by Erie, it did not clean up enough.

With sleight of hand that still leaves me blinking, the Court in West supplied a
different “plain meaning” to Rule 3 for federal question cases and did not
consider the Enabling Act problems that interpretation might be thought to
present. In particular, the Court did not consider the fact that the original
Advisory Committee, in a Note which had been quoted in Walker, feared such
problems in both federal question and diversity cases.
Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 702 (footnotes omitted).
83
Cf. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (“In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a
statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service on . . . the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations.”).
84
See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 703-09 (discussing this theory
with reference to West). On the problem of incorporating in Federal Rules federal law
that is (or was) valid under other sources of authority, see Burbank, supra note 5, at
1147-57, 1165-68. West may be viewed as an example of reverse incorporation—that is,
using a Federal Rule as a source for a common law rule. It fares no better from that
perspective. See id. at 1158-63 (examining tolling statutes and reverse incorporation).
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85

In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the Court may have
found it difficult to read Appellate Rule 38 (dealing with discretionary
sanctions for frivolous appeals) to collide directly with state law (providing a mandatory ten-percent penalty when a stayed judgment is affirmed on appeal). The Court may thus have believed that it would
have been necessary to apply the state statute under Hanna’s modified
86
The Court may also have believed,
outcome-determination test.
however, that federal law should control whether, when, and to what
extent financial consequences attendant on continued lack of success
shape losing federal court litigants’ incentives to appeal. Or at least it
may have so believed given the existence not only of Appellate
Rule 38, on which it primarily relied, but also of 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (authorizing federal appellate courts to award delay damages and single
87
or double costs to the prevailing party in their discretion), Appellate
88
Rule 37 (dealing with postjudgment interest), and 28 U.S.C. § 1961
89
90
(dealing with prejudgment interest), which it also cited.
That
might explain why the Court in Burlington Northern framed “the initial
step” as “to determine whether Federal Rule 38 is ‘sufficiently broad’
to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control
the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation
91
of that law.” Moreover, it might explain why the Court focused not
just on the fact that Appellate Rule 38’s “discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s
92
affirmance penalty,” but also on the fact that “the purposes underlying
85

480 U.S. 1 (1987).
See Whitten, supra note 56, at 35-41 (discussing the questions raised by Burlington Northern, including those raised by Rule 38).
87
28 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006).
88
FED. R. APP. P. 37.
89
28 U.S.C. § 1961.
90
See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4, 7 n.5.
91
Id. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50 & n.9). The problem is that the
question “whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control
the issue before the Court,” Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50, and the question whether there
is a “direct collision,” id. at 750 n.9, between the Federal Rule and state law, are not
obviously the same question, even though the Walker Court seemed to conflate them.
86

Logic indicates, . . . and a careful reading of the relevant passages confirms,
that [the “direct collision”] language is not meant to mandate that federal law
and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at
hand; rather, the “direct collision” language, at least where the applicability of
a federal statute is at issue, expresses the requirement that the federal statute
be sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute.
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1988).
92
Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7.
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the Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the
Alabama statute to indicate that the Rule occupies the statute’s field of
93
operation so as to preclude its application in federal diversity actions.”
On this view, whereas the Walker Court was preoccupied by conflict preemption, the Burlington Northern Court was, tentatively and alternatively, suggesting the possibility of field preemption. Moreover,
in doing so, the Court relied on an analysis of the purposes underlying the respective laws in determining whether federal and state law
94
could coexist. The opinion would have been more persuasive if the
Court had explicitly relied on all of the statutes and Federal Rules
deemed pertinent, including presumably the statutes governing federal appellate jurisdiction, and if it had discussed policy considera95
tions in addition to judicial discretion. If the Court had understood
that the analysis of scope involves reasoning akin to that underlying
federal common law that is designed to implement the purposes and
96
policies of federal statutes and Federal Rules, it could have made a
major contribution to the jurisprudence in the area, a matter we pursue further below. Instead, its unanimous opinion led one acute ob93

Id.; cf. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (“Our cases make clear that, as between these two
choices in a single ‘field of operation,’ the instructions of Congress are supreme.” (citation omitted)).
94
See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4 (purposes of state mandatory affirmance
penalty); id. at 7 (purposes of Rule 38).
95
See Whitten, supra note 56, at 22 (criticizing the Court’s response to the fact that
Alabama had a rule akin to Appellate Rule 38); id. at 23 (noting that an interpretation
of Appellate Rule 38 as implicitly “negating the power to impose penalties for unsuccessful appeals in cases not expressly covered by its terms” would have to distinguish
Cohen); id. at 23 n.117 (acknowledging that 28 U.S.C. § 1912 presented a “more plausible case for implied negation,” but noting that the Court did not discuss it); id. at 25
(“To interpret Federal Rule 37 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as sufficiently broad in scope to
cover the ground covered by the Alabama statute, one would again have to interpret
the language of the federal provisions as impliedly negating the operation of all other
laws that compensate a victorious appellee for loss of use of the judgment proceeds
during the course of an unsuccessful appeal.”). Professor Whitten thus separately responded to elements that in combination might have yielded a persuasive opinion.
Note, moreover, that his consideration of the possible influence of federal jurisdictional policy was part of an analysis of the proper result if there were no pertinent Federal Rule, was hobbled by the uncertain status of Byrd, and did not distinguish between
conflict and field preemption. See id. at 38-41.
96
See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at 812-17 (discussing circumstances in which state law borrowed as federal common law should be displaced
and distinguishing between “cases in which state preclusion law yields to federal common law in domestic litigation because a particular state rule is found hostile to or inconsistent with a particular federal substantive policy,” and “occasions when state law is
at odds, not with specifically identifiable federal substantive policies, but with the sum
of such policies, that is, a scheme of federal substantive rights as a whole”).
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server to worry that “analysis of Federal Rules–state law conflicts ha[d]
97
reached a dead end in the Supreme Court.”
98
Conversely, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., with Justice
Scalia (joined by two other dissenting Justices) contending that
Rule 59 was in “‘direct collision’” with state law regarding the standard
judges should apply in ruling on motions for a new trial based on the
99
asserted excessiveness of the verdict, the Court reasoned that “there
[was] no candidate for [governance of the question whether damages
are excessive] other than the law that gives rise to the claim for re100
In support, the Court cited, inter alia, the Enabling Act and
lief.”
commentary noting that the Court had “interpret[ed] the federal
101
rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.”
102
Finally, in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the
Court acknowledged that reading Rule 41(b) to prescribe a rule of
103
preclusion that had interjurisdictional effect “would arguably violate”
the Enabling Act and “would in many cases violate the federalism prin104
Rather than directly confronting those problems and,
ciple of Erie.”
in the process, revisiting Sibbach’s impoverished account of “substantive
rights,” the Court engaged in a process that can only charitably be described as interpretation and only in Wonderland as an exercise in
“plain meaning” interpretation. The Court reasoned that Rule 41(b),
which prescribes the effect of an involuntary dismissal, speaks only to
the ability of a claimant to “return[] later, to the same court, with the
105
same underlying claim.” The opinion rummaged in dictionaries and
97

Whitten, supra note 56, at 41.
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
99
See id. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at
5). Readers who are struck by the radical inconsistency between Justice Scalia’s approach for the Court in Shady Grove and his approach for the Court in Semtek, see infra
text accompanying notes 102-06, should compare his dissenting opinions in Gasperini
and Stewart. Indeed, the passage in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Gasperini that is quoted in the text following this footnote may have drawn inspiration from
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Stewart. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s description of the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the forum-selection clause is a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the parties.”).
100
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22.
101
Id. at 438 n.22 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
729-30 (4th ed. 1996)).
102
531 U.S. 497 (2001).
103
Id. at 503.
104
Id. at 504.
105
Id. at 505.
98
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engaged in multiple wordplays to reach a result that is demonstrably erroneous according to two very different interpretive techniques, including one that Justice Scalia, the author of the Court’s opinion, usually
106
favors: the exercise of logic in divining “plain meaning.”
E. Reinterpreting the Enabling Act
Thus, as we pursue further in Part III, the Shady Grove Court’s
wooden interpretation of Rule 23 was hardly ordained by precedent.
Moreover, although the Court has never held a Federal Rule invalid,
that is hardly cause for the institutional self-satisfaction that Justice
107
Scalia’s opinion manifests.
The limitations in question, after all,
108
concern the powers of the very institution that is interpreting them.
Moreover, the Congress that allowed the original Federal Rules to go
into effect notwithstanding the objection of Senate leaders was assured that “the Court will be zealous to correct its mistake, if any has
109
And, as part of the successful campaign to persuade
been made.”
106

See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039-47 (2002) (describing the discussion of Rule 41(b) in
Semtek). As demonstrated there, the published and unpublished record concerning
Rule 41(b)’s intended meaning contradicts the Court’s interpretation. Id. at 1042-46.
In addition,
[f]or those who are not disposed to consult or consider such materials, the
Court’s error (as a matter of interpretation) in confining the effects of a Rule
41(b) dismissal to the rendering court seems clear in light of the following consideration: if that had been the intended ambit of the rule, it would not have
made sense to except dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, since
under the doctrine of direct estoppel (issue preclusion), the plaintiff would have
been precluded from refiling the case in the same court in any event.
Id. at 1046-47 (footnotes omitted).
107
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1131, 1447
(2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (“Undoubtedly some hard
cases will arise (though we have managed to muddle through well enough in the 69
years since Sibbach was decided).”); see also id. at 1442 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts,
C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“Applying [the Sibbach ‘really regulates procedure’] test, we have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come
before us.”).
108
See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1101-02 (“The statutory limitations in question
were intended to confine the power of the Court itself, a fact that requires that the
Court ever be open to the reconsideration of past interpretations on sufficient demonstration that it has erred in interpreting the statute’s meaning.”); Paul J. Mishkin, Some
Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1687 (1974) (noting the
“inherent tendency of any institution to extend its own reach and power”).
109
Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the Honorable Joseph C. O’Mahoney, the
Honorable William H. King, the Honorable Edward R. Burke, and the Honorable
Warren R. Austin (May 26, 1938), reprinted in Hearings on S.J. Res. 281 Before a Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., pt. 2, app. at 72 (1938).
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the House not to insist on repeal of the supersession clause in the
1988 amendments to the Enabling Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
a letter asserting that the Judicial Conference and its committees
“have always been keenly aware of the special responsibility they have
in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon them not to over110
reach their charter.” In addition, as suggested above, the failure to
find a violation of the Enabling Act has frequently been made possible through Federal Rule interpretations that were restrained without
being enlightened, many of which reflected implicit acknowledgment
of the inadequacy of Sibbach, both in its federalism account of the
Enabling Act’s limitations and its narrow view of the substantive
rights that are protected.
As in Sibbach itself, the Court was made aware of the former defect
111
112
in Marek v. Chesny, and both Justice Brennan’s dissent in that case
and Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Com113
munications Enterprises, Inc. made it plain that separation-of-powers
values must be served if the Enabling Act is not to be a dead letter in
federal question cases. Moreover, since the research that uncovered
the historical support for a separation-of-powers account was published,
many, if not most, commentators have acknowledged that Sibbach’s fe114
This view is also clearly reflected in
deralism account is erroneous.
115
the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act,
which the Court has never deigned to cite, for obvious reasons.
With the exception of cases in which it has read Federal Rules not to apply,
however, the main thing the Supreme Court has been zealous about in considering challenges to their validity has been taking cover behind the process
employed prior to their effective date, particularly that part of it permitting
congressional review.
Burbank, supra note 5, at 1179.
110
Letter from the Honorable William H. Rehnquist to the Honorable Peter W.
Rodino, Jr. (Oct. 19, 1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. 31,873-74 (1988). But see Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1038 n.163 (arguing that the rulemakers have
“not always been keenly aware of” their duties).
111
473 U.S. 1 (1985).
112
See supra note 70 (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent).
113
498 U.S. 533, 554-70 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 565 (“But
Congress wanted the definition of substantive rights left to itself in cases where federal
law applies, or to the States where state substantive law governs.”).
114
See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 92 (1998) (stating that the separation-ofpowers account is now “generally accepted,” supplanting the “myth of federalism”).
115
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985) (“[I]t is not the purpose of proposed
section 2072 merely to restate whatever may be the constitutional restraints on the exercise of Congress’ lawmaking power as against that of the States . . . .”). This Report
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Virtually incoherent as an example of the interpretive technique it
prescribes, both standing alone and when paired with West v. Conrail,
the Walker decision appears to reflect doubts about Sibbach’s adequacy
in limning the substantive rights that are relevant under the Enabling
Act. Further, the Marek Court’s ostrich approach notwithstanding,
Justice Brennan’s dissent in that case, which included discussion of
congressional views rejecting proposals to amend Rule 68 on the
ground that federal attorney-fee shifting provisions confer a substan116
The law
tive right, is additional evidence supporting such doubts.
117
that determines “whether damages are excessive” for purposes of a
motion for a new trial is not unambiguously within the narrow reach
of substantive law that Sibbach shields from prospective supervisory
court rulemaking. Nonetheless, the Gasperini Court cited the Enabl118
ing Act as the first item of support for a reference to state law. Finally, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Semtek suggests that, if he had not rewritten Rule 41(b), the Court would have held that it violated the
Enabling Act. If so, however, that would not have been because rules
119
of preclusion are rules of substantive law in the Sibbach sense.
Since there was no majority opinion on the interpretation of the
Enabling Act in Shady Grove, it remains possible that the Court will
find an occasion to reconsider Sibbach in the foreseeable future. If so,
we hope that the occasion will be a case in which, as in Marek and
Business Guides, federal substantive law governs. For if the Court accepts, as realistically it must, that the Enabling Act is not a dead letter
in federal question cases, that may make it easier to accept what the
historical record underlying both the 1934 Act and the 1988 amendments establishes: the primary purpose of the Enabling Act’s procedure/substance dichotomy is to allocate prospective federal lawmaking between the Supreme Court and Congress, not to protect
lawmaking choices already made, and certainly not to protect state
lawmaking choices exclusively. To be sure, allocation standards may
have the salutary effect of protecting existing lawmaking choices. Indeed, it is reasonable to impute to Congress a concern for protecting
state lawmaking choices that affect state substantive rights, since that
body often invokes federalism as warranting solicitude for state prewas “specifically incorporated by reference in the Report of the 1988 House bill.” Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1031.
116
See supra note 70.
117
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996).
118
See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
119
See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
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rogatives. But that is a secondary consequence of the Enabling Act’s
primary concern, which is preventing the Supreme Court, exercising
delegated legislative power to promulgate court rules, from encroaching upon Congress’s lawmaking prerogatives. Once this is clear, it is
120
easier to see that Professor Ely’s work on the Enabling Act, although
helpful in showing how Hanna disaggregated the “Erie problem,” proposed the wrong path for dealing with Sibbach’s inadequacies, and
121
Hanna’s as well.
The path is wrong because it perpetuates the federalism myth that
Sibbach initiated and Hanna reaffirmed. It is also wrong because, not
laid out to reflect that the Act exists primarily to allocate lawmaking
power prospectively, it leads those who take it to seek substantive
rights in the wrong places. Ironically, in a number of cases where we
believe that the realization of Sibbach’s inadequacy influenced the decision, the Court followed that wayward path in seeking to ascertain
the rights that call for protection. As an example, the problem with
court rulemaking on the tolling rules for statutes of limitations is not
that some such rules are themselves “substantive,” as the Court sug122
It is rather that the
gests in Walker when discussing state statutes.
lawmaking choices required when framing all such rules may predictably and directly affect rights under the substantive law to which the
limitations periods in question pertain—abridging, enlarging, or modifying those rights, federal or state. The same is true of preclusion
rules, a fact that the Semtek Court, or at least Justice Scalia, may have
grasped but chose to avoid by turning Rule 41(b) into something that
those who drafted it would not have recognized.
Indeed, we think Justice Scalia likely did understand that preclusion rules would violate the Enabling Act, and he may even have seen
that there was a way to reach that conclusion under Sibbach and its
progeny. After all, the Sibbach Court left open the possibility that
prospective supervisory court rules that ostensibly regulate the litigation process might be invalid because they in fact regulate rights un123
der the substantive law “in the guise of regulating procedure.”
120

Ely, supra note 64, at 718-40.
See Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1017-18 (arguing that Ely’s “approach substitutes restrictions on rule application for restrictions on rule formulation”); Burbank, supra note 5, at 1122-23, 1127 n.510, 1180-81, 1187-88, 1191 n.752
(detailing the flaws in Ely’s approach).
122
See supra text accompanying note 12.
123
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (“The first [proviso or
caveat in the Enabling Act] is that the court shall not ‘abridge, enlarge, nor modify
substantive rights,’ in the guise of regulating procedure.”). For other routes to a nar121
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Moreover, in the Murphree case, which the Hanna Court also cited (in
124
addition to citing Sibbach), the Court left open the possibility that
court rules regulating procedure in the Sibbach sense might nonetheless be invalid if they had greater than “incidental effects” on the en125
forcement of the substantive law. In addition, the Murphree Court’s
reliance on postpromulgation statements “by the authorized spokes126
men for the Advisory Committee” suggested that the purpose of the
drafters is relevant in determining meaning and validity.
To be sure, these signals were muted by the Court’s subsequent
reasoning that, although Rule 4(f) “will undoubtedly affect those
[substantive] rights . . . it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or
modify the rules of decision by which th[e] court will adjudicate its
127
rights.” Still, there should have been no doubt about the substantive
rights that are relevant. Moreover, decisions rejecting Enabling Act
challenges to Rule 11, in which the Court effectively responded to attempts by lower-court judges to turn that rule into either “a fee128
shifting statute” or a collection of torts, suggest the practical utility
rowing construction of Sibbach, see Burbank, supra note 5, at 1029 n.59, 1033 n.71,
1195. See also Burbank, supra note 70, at 432.
The examples the concurrence offers—statutes of limitations, burdens of
proof, and standards for appellate review of damages awards—do not make its
broad definition of substantive rights more persuasive. They merely illustrate
that in rare cases it may be difficult to determine whether a rule “really regulates” procedure or substance. If one concludes the latter, there is no preemption of the state rule; the Federal Rule itself is invalid.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1446 n.13 (2010)
(Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.).
124
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965).
125
See Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (“Congress’
prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed
new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice
and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their
rights.”); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably
necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”).
126
Murphree, 326 U.S. at 444.
127
Id. at 446.
128
See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553
(1991) (“Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute . . . .”); id. (“Also without merit is Business
Guides’ argument that Rule 11 creates a federal common law of malicious prosecution.”); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (“Rule 11 is not a
fee-shifting statute . . . .”). Among the lower-court opinions these decisions implicitly
rejected, see, for example, Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th Cir.
1988), and Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir.
1987). See also AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
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of staying alert to rulemaking or interpretation “in the guise of regu129
lating procedure.” Like Marek, they also suggest that “rules of decision” do not exhaust the universe of relevant substantive rights.
In Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Shady Grove, he correctly declined to make the validity of a Federal Rule turn on a particularistic
and after-the-fact analysis of the policies underlying state law prescrip130
tions on the very matter that the Federal Rule covered. As one of us
has previously observed in language very similar to Justice Scalia’s,
that is a recipe for state laws of identical content, but animated by different policies, to render a Federal Rule “valid in one state and not in
131
another, here today, gone tomorrow.” Apart from its erroneous attention exclusively to state law, such an interpretation is hardly consistent with the vision of uniform and simple Federal Rules that animated the movement that brought us the Enabling Act.
Yet to say that a Federal Rule that was valid when promulgated
(because reasonably thought not to make choices that predictably and
directly affect rights under the substantive law) is forever after invulnerable to attack is neither necessary nor attractive as an alternative.
Moreover, we part company with Justice Scalia when he extends his
disdain for differential validity to the possibility of differential applica132
tion. That is, we believe that the application of a Federal Rule may
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 10-13, 35-36
(Stephen B. Burbank rep., 1989) (criticizing the lower-court decisions).
129
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941). The same is true of the 1984
proposal to amend Rule 68, where the rulemakers hoped that by calling the consequences a sanction instead of fee shifting, they could avoid Enabling Act difficulties. See
Burbank, supra note 70, at 428-29 (“What is in a word? A lot in this case, because that
word carries with it baggage the rulemakers hope will insulate them from their critics.”).
130
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444
(2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.).
The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that the substantive
nature of New York’s law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference. A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon whether
its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state procedural law
enacted for substantive purposes).
Id.
131

Burbank, supra note 5, at 1188.
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440-41 (majority opinion) (“[The dissent’s approach] would mean . . . that one State’s statute could survive pre-emption (and accordingly affect the procedures in federal court) while another State’s identical law
would not, merely because its authors had different aspirations.”). The extension is
fainthearted because it is dependent on whether a Federal Rule is thought to be ambiguous. See id. at 1442 n.7 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that ‘Congress is just as concerned as we have been to avoid significant differences between state and federal
132
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vary not according to the putative policies underlying state law on the
same matter, but rather according to the structure and operation of
state law as it interacts with and is implemented by the litigation
process. Because schemes of substantive rights are not uniform, the
respect for such schemes that the Enabling Act enjoins may require
just such differential application.
There are limits to human foresight when engaged in prospective
lawmaking, particularly when the lawmaking in question is transsubstantive. Over time, as thinking about law, litigation, and civil law enforcement has evolved, so has our understanding of what it means to
have legal rights. We now better understand what in the legal landscape—in addition to rules defining rights and duties—determines
whether citizens will be able to fructify their legal rights. Federal and
state choices regarding matters like attorneys’ fees, when designed to
affect the existence or extent of the enforcement of legal rights and
duties, should be protected against infringement by Federal Rules. It
is likely that those who promoted the bill that became the Enabling
Act would have agreed. As one of us previously noted in explaining
why the 1984 proposal to amend Rule 68 presented serious Enabling
Act questions,
[T]here is evidence that those in Congress who drafted and gave serious
attention to the bill that became the Enabling Act did not regard substantive law in this [i.e., Sibbach’s] sense as the only area to be avoided in
or protected from supervisory court rulemaking. The 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee noted that “[s]ome of our most valued civil liberties
have been obtained through the creation by legislative edict of mere remedial measures.” In its view, the grant of rulemaking power did not extend to “matters involving substantive legal and remedial rights affected
by the considerations of public policy.” The Committee included in the
category of remedial choices thus reserved for Congress [or the States]
those that “define[] or limit[] . . . civil rights . . . using that term in the
133
broad sense.”
134

The legislative history of the 1988 amendments is to the same effect.

courts in adjudicating claims.’ The assumption is irrelevant here, however, because
there is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23.”) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
133
Burbank, supra note 70, at 433 (alterations in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 691174 at 9, 12 (1926)).
134
The House Committee on the Judiciary reported that
the substantive rights protected by proposed section 2072 include rights conferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of substantive law, such as “the
right not to be injured . . . by another’s negligence” or the right not to be subject to discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Thus, the bill does
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Bringing Sibbach into the twenty-first century need not lead to the
replication of the “here today, gone tomorrow” problem that repelled
Justice Scalia. For just as the transsubstantive character of the Federal
Rules limits the rulemakers’ ability to predict with confidence when
the choices they make today might consequentially (i.e., not “incidentally”) affect the enforcement of federal and state substantive law in
the future, so too it contributes to the high level of generality of the
rules themselves. Many, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters
for discretionary decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the
actual choices to federal trial judges. To that extent, they are only su135
perficially uniform and superficially transsubstantive. The uniformity at which the Enabling Act aims must be measured in pragmatic
terms, neither fatally undermined by an approach that focuses on policies underlying state law on the same issue, nor cemented by jingoistic dogma heedless of the evolving realities of court rulemaking and
litigation practice—the fatal flaw of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Shady Grove, as we discuss in Part III.
Unless a Federal Rule alleged to violate the Enabling Act actually
makes a policy choice that Congress has had an opportunity to review
(and since the 1980s, that would have been the subject of an elaborate, multistage process involving notice, the opportunity for comment, and other requirements designed to enhance transparency and
136
accountability), the role that federal common law plays in providing
not confer power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define
or limit rights under the substantive law. The protection extends beyond
rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however. At the least, it also prevents the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have
the effect of altering existing remedial rights conferred as an integral part of
the applicable substantive law scheme, federal or state, such as arrangements
for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21-22 (1985) (footnotes omitted); see also Burbank, Hold the
Corks, supra note 12, at 1032-33 (citing the legislative history of the 1988 amendments).
135
See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 716.
If one admits that only a lawyer can think about procedure and substantive
law as if they were distinct preserves, that modern federal procedure is complex and in large measure unpredictable, and that the Federal Rules are in
similar measure only superficially uniform and trans-substantive, alternative
reform strategies appear in sharper focus.
Id.
136

See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2002) (“Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpretation of the Rules.”).
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content that the rulemakers did not prospectively entertain should be
recognized and analyzed accordingly. Thus, the Gasperini Court was
right in refusing, and Justice Scalia was quite wrong in seeking, to assimilate to Rule 59 a policy choice that its drafters did not make and that
137
federal common law could not make for state law diversity cases.
In urging resort to federal common law as a means to discipline,
by testing the validity of, policy choices sought to be imputed to Fed138
eral Rules which do not clearly make them, we hasten to add that we
are not speaking of the unifocal, hypothetical federal common law associated with Hanna’s dictum, Walker, and subsequent cases that have
found Federal Rules not to apply. One of the costs of Hanna has been
to discourage rigorous thinking about the relationship between Federal Rules and federal common law. Alternatively, sloppy thinking
about that relationship has contributed to the degraded state of Hanna jurisprudence. Byrd was undoubtedly imperfect, but it was correct
when it said that one must consider “affirmative countervailing con139
siderations,” properly conceived, in determining whether federal
common law may validly be applied.
Rule 23 was not the source of the limitations-tolling rule that the
140
Court announced in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah nor of
137

See Burbank, supra note 70, at 437 (“When a Federal Rule confers substantial
discretion on the trial judge, it is hard to understand why an exercise of that discretion
should not be required to be consistent with federal statutes—that is treated like federal common law.”); see also Burbank, supra note 5, at 1193 & nn.762-63 (describing the
“lawmaking choices” related to the Federal Rules). For a somewhat similar approach,
which in our view does not deploy an adequately robust concept of federal common
law, see Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (and What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008). See also id.
at 282-87, 297-301 (treating aspects of pleading, summary judgment, and class certification as “unguided Erie choices”); Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in
Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 297-98 (2010) (“Because [interpretive]
results are not dictated by the Federal Rules, but rather by judicial gloss, they should
not be protected by the Rules’ presumption of validity. Instead, federal interpretations
of Rule 23 should be treated as an ‘unguided Erie choice between state and federal
law.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steinman, supra, at 287)).
138
Cf. Struve, supra note 136, at 1102 (arguing that consideration of all of the aspects of the post-1980s Enabling Act process suggests less, rather than greater, freedom
in interpreting the Federal Rules).
139
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); see also supra
note 62.
140
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Even though Rule 23 does not and could not validly provide a tolling rule, in
devising such a rule “not inconsistent with the legislative purpose,” the Court
was not required to ignore the policies exogenous to limitations that animate
Rule 23, including in particular the policy against “multiplicity of activity.”
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the rule of preclusion that it announced in Cooper v. Federal Reserve
141
Bank of Richmond.
Rather, the application of Rule 23 in those proceedings was the occasion for the Court to implement class action policies in federal common law that it was otherwise authorized to make.
Whether the same policies would suffice with respect to either question to justify a federal judge-made rule different from a state rule in a
state law diversity case is a difficult question. The same is true, as
another example, of the question whether Rule 13(a) can be used to
support the application of a federal common law rule of preclusion,
waiver, or estoppel to a defendant’s failure to assert a transactionally
related counterclaim in federal diversity litigation when the state in
which the court sits imposes no such requirement. Using Rule 13(a)
in that manner would presumably need to be justified by its nonpreclusion policies, such as the quest for enhanced accuracy in the
142
resolution of related claims.
Using federal common law “to discipline, by testing the validity of,
policy choices sought to be imputed to Federal Rules which do not
143
clearly make them” is one way to make sense of the Hanna Court’s
observation that “a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the
standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need
not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it
144
would follow in state courts.” It also would make sense, without inBurbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1027-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Am.
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974)).
141
467 U.S. 867 (1984); see also Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12,
at 773 (“In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have
contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and,
when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other legal rules.”).
142
See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at 774 n.195 (noting
that Rule 13(a) “might be animated by procedural purposes within the contemplation
of the Rules Enabling Act”); id. at 772-73, 782 (noting that Rule 13 does not “provide a
rule of preclusion” and describing the Rule’s origins); see also id. at 782-83 & n.242
(discussing penalty dismissals under Rule 41(b), as to which “there is a federal interest
relating solely to the initial litigation that justifies a federal [judge-made] rule”); Stephen B. Burbank, Where’s the Beef? The Interjurisdictional Effects of New Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 87, 115-16 (1996) (exploring whether the “federal interests [underlying Rule 19] are sufficiently important, and the threat to those
interests sufficiently plausible, to justify the displacement of” New Jersey’s entirecontroversy doctrine, which, if applicable, would prompt joinder in situations not required by Rule 19).
143
See supra text accompanying note 138.
144
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965). This interpretation reads “in measuring a Federal Rule” to mean “in determining the scope of a Federal Rule.” “This
comment, however, cannot seriously be interpreted to import an outcome determina-
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terpretive gymnastics, of the otherwise puzzling invocation of “the federalism principle of Erie” in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in
145
Semtek, where, however, only such gymnastics could save Rule 41(b)
from invalidity. Very occasionally it will be necessary to swallow misplaced pride, accept that a Federal Rule has made a forbidden policy
146
choice, invalidate it, and move on. If, however, the version of federal common law employed does not focus exclusively on the incentives
or perceptions that differences in outcome create, this approach to
the interpretation of Federal Rules should usually implement the important insight of Professor Cover about what it means to have trans147
substantive rules of procedure.
Even though Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Enabling Act did
not command a majority in Shady Grove, some of his approach is faithful to the original understanding. In particular, his insistence on a
test for validity that does not depend on idiosyncratic aspects of state
law rings true for a statute that was designed primarily to allocate federal lawmaking power ex ante, rather than to protect policy choices
(let alone only state law policies) ex post. Laws that are idiosyncratic
in one historical period, however, may become the norm in another.
In addition, whether or not the traditional account of the relationship
between formalism and realism is correct, the Sibbach Court analyzed
the Enabling Act, as the original Advisory Committee justified its work,
in monolithic dichotomous terms that no longer ring true (if they ever
did). Even Congress has learned the power of procedure and knows
148
how to pursue or mask substantive aims in procedural dress.

tive test of the Guaranty Trust variety into the Enabling Act given the Court’s other remarks, and if it does not do that, it is not clear what the Court had in mind.” Whitten,
supra note 56, at 16-17 n.83.
145
Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001); see also
supra text accompanying notes 102-06 (discussing Semtek).
146
See Burbank, supra note 106, at 1047 (“It might have been better, after all, to
decide the Enabling Act question.”).
147
See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 735 (1975) (advocating reading the Enabling Act “to mean that
the courts, in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . may not forsake their
responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substantive values [so that] [i]t
would not be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have to justify invoking it”).
148
See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1726 (2004).
The specific experience of the proposed Evidence Rules and a new jurisprudential climate combined to make members of Congress and their staffs
aware of the potential of rulemaking choices to submerge substantive in favor
of procedural policies, of supervisory court rulemaking to impinge on Con-

BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

52

11/18/2010 10:59 AM

[Vol. 159: 17

For both reasons, there is greater reason for anxiety today than
there was in 1941 about an interpretation of delegated legislative
power that reads language of limitation out of the statute. It is no
surprise that the Court has ignored the attempt in 1988 to provide a
standard more faithful to both the original understanding and evolving needs, both because the Court does not easily accept imposed limitations on its own power and because the attempt was confined to
legislative history. Yet acknowledging that reasonable minds can differ about what the standard for the validity of a Federal Rule under
the Enabling Act should be—albeit not about the primary goal of the
allocation scheme employed—we hope to have made clear the need
for moderate and restrained interpretation of Federal Rules that otherwise would impinge on the freedom of Congress or the States to
pursue lawmaking aims that might traditionally be characterized as
substantive through means that one might traditionally characterize as
149
procedural. The key to that approach is a nuanced appreciation of
Federal Rules—one that, in the absence of express policy choices, resolves questions of scope by paying attention to what federal common
law might achieve if the court could consider, in addition to outcome
and the twin aims of Erie, federal policies demonstrably rooted in
sources of unquestioned validity, including the Constitution, federal
150
statutes, and Federal Rules.

gress’s lawmaking prerogatives, and of procedure consequentially to affect
substantive rights.
Id. Likewise,
for those many matters where the Federal Rules make no choices, leaving the
procedure/substance accommodation to discretionary decisionmaking, the
claim must be that Congress’s substantive agenda is always better served by
trusting to the discretion of federal judges and thus abjuring the potentially
potent technique of using procedure to drive, or to mask, substance.
Id. at 1731-32.
149
See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 544 n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that a demand requirement in shareholder derivative litigation, “designed to improve corporate governance, is one of substantive
law,” and because Rule 23.1 “does not clearly create such a substantive requirement by
its express terms, it should not be lightly construed to do so and thereby alter substantive rights”); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991) (citing Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Daily Income Fund with approval).
150
“[T]he major obstacle to the development of principled guides to decision is
the articulation of processes by which the competing policies are identified and decisional weight attached to them.” Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at
789. In our view, “[f]ederal courts are not free to conjure up ‘interests’; rather, they
must tie them to policies already articulated in, or at least articulable from, valid legal
prescriptions.” Id. at 789-90.
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III. RECAPTURING THE ROLE OF LIABILITY AND REGULATORY
POLICY IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION
A. Federal Rule 23
The dynamic process of interpretation that we describe above,
and that we believe is necessary for the sensible and faithful interpretation of rules promulgated under the limited delegation of authority
that the Enabling Act contains, is hardly new. In fact, it provides an
apt vocabulary for describing the terms of the debate that surrounded
the promulgation of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23, as well as some of
the calls for reform that followed those revisions. The tension between the potential for aggregate litigation to transform liability policy
and the limited mandate of the Federal Rules has been one of the
dominant themes in many discussions of the class action device. So
too has an understanding that rigid formal categories are inadequate,
indeed counterproductive, when one seeks to describe and justify the
permissible bounds of a class action proceeding and the binding effect of a resulting judgment. That history makes all the more remarkable Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Shady Grove, which disregards the lessons of history and the realities of the present in favor
of a formalistic description of the class action as nothing more than a
joinder rule like any other.
The 1966 revisions to Rule 23 were preceded by a decades-long debate that centered largely on the binding or preclusive effect of the
judgment a class proceeding produces, along with the manner in which
the nature of the rights being asserted shaped that binding effect. As
Professors Hazard, Geded, and Sowle have explained in detail, the
modern class action had its origins in equity practice, which developed
specialized proceedings for specific types of substantive actions that
would allow a court to adjudicate claims affecting multiple parties de151
spite the absence of some parties from the proceeding. In the terminology associated with original Rule 23, the “true” class action was available to resolve rights deemed joint or common among class members,
the “hybrid” action permitted the resolution of claims that were several
in nature but respected a specific res or common property interest, and
the disfavored “spurious” class action described proceedings in which
class members possessed rights that were several in nature and not limited to a specific res but that nonetheless shared common issues of
151

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John Geded & Stephen Sowle, The Binding Effect of
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
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152

law or fact and a common request for relief. In each case, the putative nature of the right at issue—a characterization that was often contested—determined the potential availability of expansive joinder and,
an importantly distinct question, the potential for the judgment result153
ing from the proceeding to bind all class members.
As originally drafted, Rule 23 sought to accommodate this taxonomy, setting forth a mechanism that enabled claimants to initiate a
class proceeding in one of three categories that broadly tracked existing equity doctrine and explicitly tied the availability of a class pro154
ceeding to the “character of the right sought to be enforced” while
providing little additional guidance about how to administer the proceeding once it was underway. The Rule did not purport to define
the “character of the right” that claimants possessed, of course—a
matter that self-evidently fell outside the mandate of the Enabling Act.
Neither did the Rule purport to define the binding or preclusive effect that would result from the judgment, a matter that was a more active topic of discussion. Professor Moore, the drafter of the 1938
Rule, had proposed including a subsection entitled “Effect of Judgment” that would have locked in place the prevailing doctrine on the
respective preclusion rules applicable in each of the established cate155
The different treatment of preclusion
gories of class proceeding.
law among these categories was significant. As Professor Kaplan has
explained, Moore’s proposal would have “declar[ed] that the judgment in true actions was conclusive on the class; in hybrid actions,
conclusive upon the appearing parties and upon all claims whether or
not presented insofar as they affected the property; and in spurious
156
actions, conclusive only upon the appearing parties.” But the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules rejected the suggestion, believing that
the power to specify the binding effect of a class judgment upon ab152

Id. at 1937-39.
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Tribute, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and the Lessons of
History, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (2010) (noting the separate “provenance and
. . . evolutionary path” of these distinct doctrines and the importance of Hazard et al.’s
work in clarifying that history). The potential for “one way” spurious classes, in which
class members could sit out the proceedings and wait to see the outcome, only choosing to appear and be bound if the result was favorable, was the focus of some of the
most intense scrutiny. See Hazard et al., supra note 151, at 1857.
154
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(3) (1938).
155
See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937) (discussing the rejection of his “Effect
of Judgment” proposal).
156
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 377-78 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
153
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sentees exceeded their mandate: “The Committee consider it beyond
their functions to deal with the question of the effect of judgments on
157
persons who are not parties.” Professor Moore instead included his
account of the binding effect of class proceedings in his influential
treatise, which went on to shape the development of federal common
158
law in the area.
As class action practice developed in the decades that followed,
this rigid formulation of original Rule 23 was predictably constraining.
By limiting the availability of the class action mechanism to cases involving specific categories of rights, the Rule pressured courts to conform their substantive analysis to those categories, and the abstract nature of the categories prevented the resulting doctrine from
159
cohering.
This, combined with the Rule’s lack of guidance regarding the administration of class proceedings, caused the class action
160
device to “become snarled,” leading the Advisory Committee to conclude that a reformulation was in order. Among the lessons that were
apparent following the drafters’ first effort was “that right answers
should not depend on the mere preservation of the categories or ter161
minology of rule 23, but rather on the play of the intrinsic policies.”
When the Advisory Committee undertook to reformulate Rule 23
and produced the basic framework under which the Rule now operates, two opposing forces—the limits of the Enabling Act and the
demonstrated ability of this powerful Rule to shape underlying doc157

ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 60 (1937), reprinted in Kaplan, supra note 156,
at 378 & n.79.
158
See, e.g., 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.07 (1st ed.
1938) (recounting the Advisory Committee’s refusal to include an “Effect of Judgment” section and offering an approving summary of the current state of the law on
the binding effects of different class proceedings); 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.11 (2d ed. 1948 & 1974 Supp.) (offering a more mollified account of the Advisory Committee proceedings and summarizing caselaw on the binding effects of different class proceedings under original Rule 23).
As Professor Chafee put it:
Nowise discouraged at being thus locked out at the front door, Mr. Moore
soon contrived to slip in by the back door. . . . So great is the deserved respect
for his treatise, that his scheme about binding outsiders has had almost as
much influence upon judges as if it had been embodied in Rule 23.
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 251 (1950); see also Kaplan, supra
note 156, at 378-79 & n.82 (noting the influence of Moore’s work on the Committee).
159
See Kaplan, supra note 156, at 380-86 (discussing different courts’ various interpretations of the categories).
160
Id. at 385.
161
Id. at 384.
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trine—occupied a prominent position in their efforts. Professor Kaplan, who served as the Reporter to the Committee, captures this shifting balance when describing the changes that the 1966 revision
worked in the structure and operation of the Rule:
It is implicit in what has been said that the anomaly of a class action covering only the particular parties does not survive under the new rule.
Subdivision (c)(2) makes clear that the judgment in any class action
maintained as such extends to the [entire] class (excluding opters-out in
(b)(3) cases), whether or not favorable to the class. This is a statement of
how the judgment shall read, not an attempted prescription of its subsequent res
162
judicata effect, although looking ahead with hope to that effect.

The constraints of the old Rule had limited the effectiveness of the
class action device. Those limits flowed from the form of substantive
rights for which the Rule authorized enforcement, not from any definition of the content of those rights or of the preclusive consequences
of litigating them in an aggregate proceeding prescribed by the Rule
itself. But their effect was still significant. In seeking to sweep away
those constraints and respond to “the insistent need to improve the
163
methods of handling litigation affecting groups,” the Committee
sought to benefit from this same dynamic tension. It restructured the
Rule in a manner that relied on corresponding alterations in the law
of preclusion, disclaiming any power to effectuate those changes itself
164
but “hop[ing]” —one might say expecting—that subsequent courts
pronouncing on the underlying law would follow suit.
The Committee’s approach to Rule 23(b)(3) and the requirements of diversity jurisdiction evinces this same tension between the
limits of the Enabling Act and the power of Federal Rules to shape or
catalyze developments in the underlying law. Under the old categories, jurisdiction over nondiverse absent class members in true or hybrid proceedings was justified on a theory of ancillary jurisdiction, but
the spurious class action, which bound only parties who actually made
an appearance, was ill suited for such treatment. These old doctrines
raised the question whether the new (b)(3) action, which made no
exception for nondiverse absentees, would entail an extension of subject matter jurisdiction that would violate either Rule 82 (which prohibits the extension of jurisdiction by rule) or the Enabling Act itself.
Professor Kaplan notes this potential objection in his account of the
Committee’s work but then dismisses it, invoking the active relation162
163
164

Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 393.
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ship between the Rules and the underlying law as the proper frame
within which to address this question:
[E]ven if one should accept dubious doctrine about the outworn spurious
category as immovable law, it would not be decisive of problems under
the new rule. New rule 23 alters the pattern of class actions; subdivision
(b)(3), in particular, is a new category deliberately created. Like other
innovations from time to time introduced into the Civil Rules, those as to
class actions change the total situation on which the statutes and theories
regarding subject matter jurisdiction are brought to bear. From the start
the Civil Rules, elaborating and complicating actions through joinder of
claims and parties, have profoundly influenced jurisdictional result. . . . Not only must new rule 23 be considered a fresh datum for deciding whether diversity of citizenship requirements are satisfied by the
original parties or intervenors; it also presents a new complex in deciding
165
questions of permissible “aggregation” of amounts in controversy.

The reformulated Rule did not purport to change jurisdictional policy, but it changed the landscape against which courts and legislatures
must shape that policy.
The implications of the revised Rule for the enforcement of important public norms were immediately apparent, particularly for
Rule 23(b)(3). Professor Kaplan’s predictions regarding the effect of
the revisions on the underlying law were less prescient here than in
the case of preclusion, however. In several of its first major decisions
on the revised Rule, the Supreme Court undercut the power of
Rule 23 as a mechanism for enforcing small claims. Although it reaffirmed the Cauble rule for measuring diversity in class actions accord166
ing to the citizenship of the named plaintiffs, the Court interpreted
167
the diversity statute to prohibit aggregation or ancillary jurisdic168
tion as a means of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement,
effectively removing the federal courts from the business of hearing
169
small claims based on state law. And in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
the Court disapproved efforts by a district court to resolve practical
165

Id. at 399-400 (footnotes omitted).
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (describing the rule of Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), as “current doctrine”).
167
See id. at 338 (“[T]he 1966 changes in Rule 23 did not and could not have
changed the interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘matter in controversy.’”).
168
See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973) (holding that the Snyder
rule requires dismissal of any plaintiff who fails to meet the jurisdictional amount),
overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006), as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
169
That state of affairs has changed since the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43.
166
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obstacles in small-claim class actions brought under federal law, finding that Rule 23 imposed a strict individual-notice requirement that
prohibited reliance upon a sample-based approach and did not au170
thorize the imposition of notice costs upon the defendant.
Nonetheless, the power of the class action was being unleashed
during this period, with attendant complaints about the quest for outsized fees by class counsel and the settlement pressure that large ex171
posure and discovery costs can impose upon defendants. The lobbying of energized interest groups led Congress and the Advisory
Committee to consider further adjustments. In 1978, the Office for
Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the Department of
Justice completed a proposal recommending that Rule 23(b)(3) be
replaced by a statutory mechanism that would provide greater access
and accountability for small-claims actions, coupled with mechanisms
for more government oversight in higher-stakes damages actions. The
proposal, reproduced in the Congressional Record in conjunction
with a debate in the Senate Judiciary Committee, begins by setting
forth the Justice Department’s view that “revision of class damage procedures should be accomplished by direct legislative enactment rather
than through the rule-making process” because of “the perception
172
that such revision would have a significant impact on public policy.”
It continues:
The deterrence of widespread injury is of substantial public interest, and
Congress should devote extensive consideration to any proposal. Also,
revision of class damage procedures would have significant economic
ramifications, which raise serious questions as to whether such revision is

170

See 417 U.S. 156, 173-79 (1974). In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340 (1978), the Court held that representative plaintiffs usually must pay the costs of
identifying class members for notice purposes. See id. at 359.
171
See Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1604-23
(1976) (discussing the concern that class counsel were receiving “spectacularly large”
fee awards and describing courts’ efforts to control those awards). Although advocating invigoration of the spurious class action (in 1941) for purposes of private enforcement, Kalven and Rosenfield noted that administrative enforcement had a number of
advantages, in particular with respect to “much new social legislation,” where “the
tempering of the enforcement of law by such discretion,” which they had defined as
“consistent, coherent, politic application, . . . is of real importance.” Harry Kalven, Jr.
& Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684,
719 (1941). They continued, “No such restraint can be expected if the law is administered through private litigation; rather, the method will result in an insistence upon
the harshest results and the most technical interpretations.” Id.
172
124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978).

BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/18/2010 10:59 AM

Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove

59

appropriately within the scope of the rule-making authority granted by
173
the Rules Enabling Act.

The proposal suggests (1) replacing the small-claim damages class action with a public action that aims exclusively at deterrence and vests
the right of recovery directly in the government—a formal alteration
of substantive rights that would unquestionably have exceeded the
mandate of the rulemakers; and (2) restructuring class actions involving larger damages claims to improve efficiency and fairness of admin174
istration without sacrificing individual compensation.
As with the 1966 amendments, this ultimately unsuccessful push
for reform had to grapple with the indefinite status of Rule 23 in relation to underlying substantive law. That effort was not always enlightening. In his remarks introducing the proposal, for example, Senator DeConcini framed the issue by explaining that the “primary
purpose” of a small-claims class action under Rule 23(b)(3) was “to
prevent unjust enrichment and to deter illegal conduct rather than to
compensate the injured parties,” whereas the “primary focus” in class
175
litigation involving larger claims was “compensation of the parties.”
As a broad account of the policy goals that the underlying law will often want to see vindicated in such actions, these descriptions are apt.
But the failure to clarify that it is the underlying law, and not Rule 23,
that is the source of these policy priorities is unfortunate, particularly
in an introduction to a proposal that focuses such explicit attention
on that distinction.
But Senator DeConcini is to be forgiven, for this failure to distinguish clearly between the class action mechanism and the policies of
176
the underlying law that it helps to enforce is endemic. Judge Posner’s much-noted opinion for the Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc
177
Rorer Inc. is illustrative. Rhone-Poulenc involved a proposed nation173
174
175
176

Id.
Id. at 27,860-61.
Id. at 27,859.
See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1522 n.329.

Recent scholarship has correctly noted the weakness of an agency-costs critique when applied to negative-value class actions in which the main goal can
plausibly be deemed deterrence rather than compensation. . . . In my view,
however, those authors have not succeeded in articulating a principled method for determining when deterrence is plausibly deemed the main goal of
litigation (which surely requires attention to the substantive-law scheme), or
in suggesting means to prevent inefficient overenforcement.
Id. (citations omitted).
177
51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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wide class action filed on behalf of hemophiliacs who were accidental178
ly infected with HIV through their use of tainted blood products. A
district court had certified a nationwide class encompassing all such
individuals, limited to the issue of the defendant drug companies’
179
negligence in failing to detect the virus. There being no avenue at
180
that time for immediate appellate review of certification orders, the
defendants requested that the Seventh Circuit interrupt the proceed181
ings with a writ of mandamus. The majority granted the request for
182
extraordinary relief and ordered that the issue class be decertified.
In explaining the reasons for rejecting the nationwide class, Judge
Posner raised two concerns. The first related to the impact of a class
proceeding on the industry for manufactured blood products and the
then-nascent state of negligence litigation on individually filed claims.
By certifying a nationwide class, Judge Posner observed, the district
court is “forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the
outcome of a single jury trial” or else “to settle even if they have no le183
gal liability” for “fear of the risk of bankruptcy.”
At the time, thirteen negligence cases had been litigated to verdict, with only one producing a judgment for the plaintiffs. Judge Posner opined that it
would be preferable to defer industry-wide resolution of the liability
question until “a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards of liability” was given the opportunity to produce a “consensus or maturing of judgment” on the appropriate liability response to the tragedy that had befallen this
184
Judge Posner did not tie these observapopulation of claimants.
tions to any particular liability policies, instead seeming to offer them

178

Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1294-95, 1296-97. This was an aggressive use of the authority Rule
23(c)(4)(A) (now restyled as 23(c)(4)) grants to certify a class “with respect to particular issues.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
180
Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to authorize appellate courts to review certification decisions at their discretion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
181
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294.
182
Id. at 1304.
183
Id. at 1299.
184
Id. at 1299-1300. It cannot have escaped Judge Posner’s notice that mass tort
defendants typically devote careful attention to which cases are tried (and in what order), settling those that they consider weak from a defense perspective. This phenomenon casts in a somewhat different light the statistics adduced in Rhone-Poulenc.
179
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as a statement about class action policy under Rule 23, which is how
185
other courts have understood them.
The court’s second concern was the liability standard that would
govern in a nationwide negligence action. Choice-of-law principles
might well call for the application of the negligence laws of fifty different states, but the district court had concluded that it could harmonize
186
these standards so as to produce a single instruction for the jury. In
another memorable turn of phrase, Judge Posner disapproved such an
“Esperanto instruction,” which he found tantamount to a rejection of
Erie and a return to a general common law standard that would disregard or erase differences among States about the nuances (and poten187
tially the core features) of negligence policy. For both these reasons,
188
the court concluded, the class had to be decertified.
What is striking, for present purposes, is Judge Posner’s lack of attention in the first part of his analysis to the policy differences that
States might have regarding the “mature tort” problem and the relative merits of decentralized adjudication, which offers the benefit of
accreted wisdom over time but may produce results that lack uniformity and appear arbitrary, versus a high-stakes industry-wide trial,
which creates greater risks of inaccurate or unreliable results but also
provides greater parity and fairness among claimants. There is no
right answer to the question whether this is a matter of class action
policy or liability policy. It partakes of both—and the existence of a
new and robust procedural mechanism for the adjudication of claims
enables courts and legislatures to confront new questions of liability
policy that had previously lain quiescent or gone wholly unad189
dressed. As Professor Cover has explained,
185

See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996)
(adopting Judge Posner’s treatment of “maturing” torts in rejecting proposed nationwide class action on behalf of all nicotine-dependent smokers).
186
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300-02.
187
Id. at 1300-01.
188
Id. at 1300-02. The court also raised Seventh Amendment concerns about the
district court’s plan to bifurcate the trial of the common and individual issues, with
separately empanelled juries deciding the latter as needed, suggesting that such a procedure might violate the Seventh Amendment’s Reexaminiation Clause. Id. at 130204. That part of the court’s analysis, not germane here, is unconvincing. See Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 776-82
(2005) (critiquing Judge Posner’s reliance on the “sparse words” of the Reexamination
Clause to limit successive class action suits as “simply not sustainable”).
189
In this respect, our view differs from that of Professor Richard Nagareda, who
appears to posit a more static relationship between class action practice and the underlying substantive law. In his highly theorized account of these matters, Professor Naga-
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Federal Rule 23 presents a procedural possibility which, once present,
cannot help but shape and articulate substantive law. That shaping is as
real if the opportunity is foregone as it is if the possibility is seized. For a
190
choice to forego is pregnant in a way that doing without can never be.

Judge Posner, too, reverted to Esperanto when providing guidance on these matters.
The history of Rule 23, then, entails a seventy-year-long discussion
of the deeply intertwined relationship between the procedural mechanism that enables aggregation of large numbers of claims for adjudication and the capacity of that mechanism to ossify certain liability
rules (in the case of original Rule 23) or to catalyze innovation in the
liability policies of the underlying law (in the case of the post-1966 version of the Rule, and particularly Rule 23(b)(3)). The Court’s inattention to the Enabling Act implications of this powerful device during
most of that time, including the proper construction of the Rule in
light of those implications, has been surprising. Before Shady Grove,
the Court’s only substantial statement on the issue came in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard, where it rejected an adventuresome use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
that sought to aggregate individual personal-injury claims into a mandatory class settlement on the theory that the total value of the defendant’s insurance coverage and net worth could be treated as a “limited
191
Vaguely gesturing toward “the tension between the limited
fund.”
fund class action’s pro rata distribution in equity and the rights of individual tort victims at law,” the Court adopted a restrained interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) that hewed more closely to the historical an-

reda correctly distinguishes between the limited delegation of rulemaking authority
contained in the Enabling Act and the role of politically accountable policymakers in
defining the content and scope of enforceable rights. See Richard A. Nagareda, The
Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181-98
(2003). As suggested by the name that he chooses for his theory, however, Professor
Nagareda appears to conceptualize those rights as having a fixed status that is unrelated
to the potential use of aggregation for enforcement. See, e.g., id. at 197 (“The [preexistence] principle prefers to respect the bundle of rights previously generated through
processes in which there is a long run—flawed though that bundle might be—over the alternatives that might be created through the one-shot, and thus more fallible, vehicle of
private delegations by class action rule.”); see also id. (acknowledging the potential for
this approach to produce “inaction”). In so doing, we believe, Nagareda misses the dynamic nature of the relationship that has in fact existed between liability rules and the
procedural and jurisdictional backdrop against which policymakers play those rules out.
190
Cover, supra note 147, at 720; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Effect of the
Class Action Rule on the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973) (“Substantive law is
shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.”).
191
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999).
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192

tecedents mentioned in the Advisory Committee notes —an unsatisfying analysis, but one that at least acknowledged the dynamic tension
193
that has characterized the entire history of the Rule.
Read against this history, the Court’s treatment of the interplay
between the Enabling Act and the proper interpretation of Rule 23 in
Shady Grove exhibits a lack of sophistication that is difficult to fathom.
First, Justice Scalia dismisses the proposition that a court should
look to the policies embodied in the underlying substantive law when
deciding whether class certification is appropriate, pointing to the
language in Rule 23 providing that a class action “may be maintained”
if the requirements of the Rule are satisfied:
There is no reason . . . to read Rule 23 as addressing only whether claims
made eligible for class treatment by some other law should be certified as
class actions. Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly
empowers a federal court “to certify a class in each and every case” where
the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is exactly what Rule 23 does: It says
that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be
maintained” (emphasis added)—not “a class action may be permitted.”
Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do. The discretion suggested by
Rule 23’s “may” is discretion residing in the plaintiff: He may bring his
claim in a class action if he wishes. And like the rest of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies “in all civil actions and
194
proceedings in the United States district courts.”

Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s attempt to buttress his analysis
through the aggressive use of italics for emphasis, there is ample reason
to read Rule 23 as requiring attention to the question that the majority dismissed: whether the use of the class action mechanism in a given
case will promote or frustrate the substantive liability policies of the
192

Id. at 845-48.
Professor David Shapiro’s scholarly voice has been one of the most important
in developing an advanced understanding of the relationship between the class action
mechanism and the underlying substantive law. Shapiro’s classic 1998 article offered a
strong defense of an aggregate-litigation model that treats some claims as no longer
the property of individual rights holders but rather the possession of an entity—the
class—that should be the primary point of reference when thinking about questions of
autonomy and agency in the litigation process. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 918-42 (1998). In exploring the
implications of this approach, Shapiro correctly concludes that the decisions involved
in such a shift in paradigm must come from responsible policymakers, rather than
Rule 23 itself. See id. at 957 (“In my view, [Rule 23] should be framed in a way that
does not place unreasonable roadblocks in the way of movement toward an entity
model by responsible policymakers, nor should it impede recognition of the present
force and effect of the model in the administration of class actions.”).
194
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438
(2010) (citations omitted).
193
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underlying law. That question has in fact served as a constant counterpoint, both in the application and interpretation of the Rule and in
discussions about reform. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent,
“Palmer, Ragan, Cohen, Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek provide good reason
to look to the law that creates the right to recover” in determining the
195
proper scope and operation of a Federal Rule. In the case of Rule 23
itself, the Court in Ortiz rejected the notion that certification was mandatory whenever the Rule’s enumerated requirements were satisfied,
explaining that “tension” between the application of the Rule and the
goals of the underlying law, even if “acceptable under the Rules Enabling Act,” should nonetheless be “kept within tolerable limits” by offer196
ing a restrained interpretation of the Rule’s open-ended provisions.
Justice Scalia, however, refused even to acknowledge the existence
of such tension in Shady Grove. Speaking for the four-Justice plurality,
he characterized Rule 23 as nothing more than a claims-processing
mechanism, requiring no more attention under the Enabling Act than
any other joinder rule. “A class action, no less than traditional joinder,” he wrote, “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of
multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and
197
the rules of decision unchanged.”
Justice Scalia likewise dismissed
the impact of class certification on the defendant’s exposure to liability with another formalistic account of aggregate litigation:
Allstate contends that . . . [a]llowing Shady Grove to sue on behalf of a
class “transform[s] [the] dispute over a five hundred dollar penalty into a
dispute over a five million dollar penalty.” Allstate’s aggregate liability,
however, does not depend on whether the suit proceeds as a class action.
Each of the 1,000-plus members of the putative class could . . . bring a
freestanding suit asserting his individual claim. It is undoubtedly true
that some plaintiffs who would not bring individual suits for the relatively small sums involved will choose to join a class action. That has no
198
bearing, however, on Allstate’s or the plaintiffs’ legal rights.

Rather, Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]he likelihood that some (even many)
plaintiffs will be induced to sue by the availability of a class action is
just the sort of ‘incidental effec[t]’ we have long held does not violate

195

Id. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845.
197
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J.,
and Sotomayor, J.).
198
Id. (citation omitted).
196
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199

§ 2072(b).” Nowhere in any part of his opinion, either for the majority or the plurality, does Justice Scalia even mention the monumental pressure that class certification imposes on defendants to settle—a
200
dominant factor in the practical dynamics of class litigation —or the
decades of effort by courts, including the Supreme Court itself in Ortiz, to shape class action practice to avoid compromising important
policies bound up in the substantive law.
What is one to make of this performance? The most charitable interpretation, we think, is that the majority simply could not see a way
to uphold the facial validity of Rule 23 while at the same time acknowledging the industry-changing impact of class action practice.
But describing Rule 23 as a prosaic joinder provision whose expansion
of liability exposure is merely an “incidental effect” does not describe
201
reality, and we should not pretend otherwise. The legislative history
and statutory findings that undergird the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 certainly represent Congress’s repudiation of that proposition,
202
whatever else one might say about them.
Less charitably, Justice Scalia and others who joined his opinion
may have been methodologically hostile to the more textured mode
of analysis required to harmonize Rule 23 with the Enabling Act—one
that rejects dogmatic adherence to transsubstantive procedure and
199

Id. But cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“‘The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.’” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th
Cir. 1997))). Since Amchem found that the settlement class action before it stood in violation of Rule 23, the Court was not required to offer a careful analysis of the origins of
this policy preference. Justice Ginsburg’s reference to the “class action mechanism,” see
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, suggests a lack of precision in that regard—this incentive problem is one that the underlying substantive law must address, not Rule 23.
200
Even Justice Ginsburg—in whose dissent we find much to admire—only mentions settlement once, in two brief sentences in a footnote. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at
1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A court’s decision to certify a class accordingly places pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims. When representative
plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may be heightened because a class
action poses the risk of massive liability unmoored to actual injury.” (citation omitted)).
201
Cf. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2086-94 (2008) (describing the Court’s
unrealistic treatment of the opt-out procedure in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985), and the doctrinal distortions that it has produced).
202
See Burbank, supra note 23, 1444 n.12 (discussing the 2005 Senate Report on
the Class Action Fairness Act and reactions of courts and commentators); Wolff, supra
note 201, at 2038-40 & nn.6-9 (discussing factual findings in the Class Action Fairness
Act concerning the impact of class action litigation on industry and public policy); see
also S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
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the allure of artificially crisp formalisms, recognizing instead the dialectic relationship that necessarily exists between the prospective intentions of rulemakers and the actual application of open-textured
203
provisions over time. Such a mode of analysis would have produced
a very different result in Shady Grove.
Rule 23 empowers federal courts to construct representative proceedings that bind absent class members on the promise of adequate
204
representation and other important “procedural protections.” Contrary to Justice Scalia’s dismissive view, authorizing such a proceeding
bears directly upon liability policy when it radically alters the levels of
enforcement of public norms. Discussing standing cases, for example,
Professor Cover put the point this way:
The conferral of rights of participation upon those whose interest is remote or, in a sense, gratuitous, must represent in large part a judgment
about the likelihood of a particular form of litigation taking place without
such participation, and about the desirability of encouraging such litigation. . . . One might wish to encourage litigation in order to deter a certain
kind of conduct (by structuring litigation risks and making adverse results
more likely) or in order to protect a certain class of persons considered
205
particularly vulnerable to some specified form of predatory conduct.

These are judgments, Cover explained, that “must be made on an in206
dividual basis for each substantive question.”
The proximity of class action litigation to matters of such substantive moment need not pose a threat under the Enabling Act, unless one
views Rule 23 itself as the source of all such policy judgments. Manifestly, it cannot be. But the unleashing of a powerful new procedural mechanism can serve as the occasion for substantive innovation through
207
the common law process. Again Professor Cover captures this dynam203

This species of sensible pragmatism is a hallmark of Justice Ginsburg’s work in
procedure and related fields. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Sensible Pragmatism in Federal Jurisdictional Policy, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 839 (2009).
204
See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008) (describing conditions necessary for a representative proceeding to be binding on absent parties).
205
Cover, supra note 147, at 728.
206
Id.
207
The historical record reflects that the drafters of Rule 23 viewed the possibility
that the Rule would catalyze substantive innovation as both inevitable and desirable.
There has been much debate about the goals of the drafters of Rule
23(b)(3). Study of the published and unpublished material relating to their
work persuades me that, although they did not foresee, and could not have
foreseen, all of the effects of this change, they were aware that they were
breaking new ground and that those effects might be substantial. Seeking to
ensure that members of a class would be bound by an adverse judgment as
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ic relationship with characteristic grace: “As part of the repository of
our collective procedural imagination the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be read to include remedial structures which could be ap208
plied where appropriate in light of substantive objectives.”
When the underlying law is federal, the role of federal judges in
shaping the relationship between remedial structures and substantive
policy objectives is unproblematic: it is coextensive with their role as
209
expositors of federal common law.
When state liability policies govern the proceeding, however, the common law role of the federal judiciary has a different character. A federal court’s task in a diversity
class action is to determine the content of the applicable state law
concerning the impact and desirability of an aggregate remedy on liability and regulatory goals. In many cases, the courts and legislature
of a state will not have had occasion to offer guidance about such
questions. Where that is so, a federal court must necessarily rely upon
its best judgment—informed by a combination of existing statements
of state liability policy and general principles of class adjudication—as
210
to the direction in which state authorities would move the law.
Judge Posner’s “Esperanto” assertions in Rhone-Poulenc about the danwell as benefit from one that was favorable, the drafters recognized that Rule
23(b)(3) would enable those with small claims for whom individual litigation
would be economically irrational to band together in group litigation against
a common adversary.
Burbank, supra note 23, at 1487 (footnotes omitted). But cf. Richard Marcus, Exceptionalism and Convergence: Form Versus Content and Categorical Views of Procedure, 49 SUP. CT.
L. REV. (2d ser.) 521, 532 (2010) (“The 1966 revision of the federal class action rule
was intended, in large measure, to empower the courts to implement an aggressive
strategy of social change through litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
208
Cover, supra note 147, at 735.
209
Even in such a case, being clear about whether the Federal Rule or the underlying federal law drives a rule of decision is still of great importance, as recent developments in the law of pleading amply demonstrate. Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007) (introducing a “plausibility” standard into the law of
pleading in an antitrust dispute and leaving some doubt as to whether that standard
would apply with equal force in other legal contexts), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009) (holding that the new “plausibility” standard applies to all complaints governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8). Indeed, Iqbal itself could have—and
perhaps should have—been decided on the basis that the federal common law of official immunity required a stricter pleading standard. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading
and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 555-56, 558.
For a fascinating account of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action that demonstrates the
extent to which its drafters were seeking to advance the goals of the emerging federal
substantive law of desegregation, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
210
See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991) (offering guidance
to diversity courts in determining the content of state law).
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ger of adjudicating an immature tort in a nationwide class action were
211
not misplaced; they were simply incomplete.
But when state law does contain a clear statement of the circumstances in which an aggregate remedy is or is not consistent with the
applicable liability or regulatory policies, that statement has the same
controlling effect as the liability rule itself. Such was the situation
confronting the Shady Grove Court under section 901(b) of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
B. Section 901(b)
The sequence of events associated with the enactment of section
901(b) paints a remarkably clear picture of the purpose of that statute
and the position that it occupied in the law of aggregate liability in
New York. Prior to 1975, the class action was nearly absent as a tool in
New York’s judicial machinery. The statute that preceded section
901(a) (New York’s current general class action provision), section
1005, said the following (and only the following) regarding when an
aggregate representative proceeding was authorized:
(a) When allowed. Where the question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all be212
fore the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.

The courts of New York had interpreted this provision restrictively,
holding that damages class actions were generally available only in
cases involving a privity relationship or its functional equivalent, often
also requiring that both the facts supporting the claim and the relief
211

This clarification of the sources of policy on aggregate liability helps to illustrate one of the great costs to federalism values that the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA) imposes. By moving huge numbers of state law class actions into the federal courts—including Shady Grove itself—CAFA will deprive states of the opportunity
to rule in the first instance on these important questions concerning the policies
bound up in their liability and regulatory rules and the impact of aggregate relief upon
those policies. “These potential costs of ordinary diversity litigation are much more
salient when state courts can, and predictably will, be stripped of the capacity to use a
potent remedial form to implement substantive policy in a jurisdictional world that is
no longer meaningfully concurrent.” Burbank, supra note 23, at 1529. It would behoove the federal courts to consider employing procedures for certifying questions of
state law to state courts more actively in such cases so that their rulings on the content
of state law can be authoritative, rather than predictive.
212
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1005(a) (McKinney 1963), repealed by L.1975, ch. 207, § 2 (1975).
Section (b) of the statute set forth provisions for protective orders and notice, and section (c) required court approval for dismissal or settlement of a class proceeding. See
id. at (b), (c).
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213

sought be identical among class members.
By 1973, the New York
Court of Appeals took the unusual step of acknowledging the need for
reform in an opinion, explaining that “the restrictive interpretation in
the past of [section 1005] and its predecessor statutes no longer has
the viability it may once have had” and that those restrictive doctrines
had produced “general and judicial dissatisfaction . . . [and] in many
214
instances may mean a total lack of remedy.” Observing that legislation was preferable to “judicial development in the same direction”
because “the proposed statute would assure limitations and safeguards
which would be highly desirable,” the court gave its explicit approval
to efforts then pending in the New York legislature to overhaul the
215
provision, a change that it characterized as “urgen[t].”
Two years later, the efforts of the New York legislature bore fruit,
producing two new statutory provisions. The first, section 901(a) of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules, sets forth basic requirements for certification of a class that are similar to those contained in the 1966 ver216
sion of Federal Rule 23. The second, section 901(b), then imposed
a limitation prohibiting class treatment of any “action to recover a
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by sta213

See, e.g., Onofrio v. Playboy Club of New York, Inc., 205 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1965),
adopting 244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disallowing a class action seeking to represent 50,000 people who had paid dues for the establishment of a private club that never came into being, where some class members
might not wish to sue or might pursue a different form of remedy); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 18 N.E.2d 287, 290-91 (N.Y. 1938) (disallowing a damages class action, but permitting a declaratory class action, in a case seeking reimbursement on behalf of a class of similarly situated customers whom the defendant utility company
allegedly charged illegal fees); see also ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK app. D at A35-36 (1973) (describing class actions in New York
as generally limited “to the closely associated relationships growing out of trusts, partnerships, or joint ventures, and ownership of corporate stock”).
214
Moore v. Metro. Life Ins., 307 N.E.2d 554, 558 (N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted).
215
Id.
216
Importantly, however, the New York provision requires that common issues
predominate over individual issues in any class action, not just those seeking compensatory damages. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2006) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all if: 1. the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; 2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class
which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; 3. the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; 4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; and 5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (employing similar language and standards).
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tute” unless specifically authorized by the statute itself—that is, unless
the statute “creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class ac217
tion.” As the Court of Appeals explained in Sperry v. Crompton Corp.,
this limitation on aggregate liability in New York “was the result of a
218
compromise among competing interests” that arose from concerns
among prodefendant groups that the aggregation of penalties would
lead to gross and destructive overenforcement. “These groups feared
that recoveries beyond actual damages could lead to excessively harsh
results . . . . They also argued that there was no need to encourage litigation by aggregating damages when statutory penalties and minimum measures of recovery provided an aggrieved party with a suffi219
Section 901(b), the
cient economic incentive to pursue a claim.”
Court held, “[r]espond[ed] to these concerns” by eliminating the
“‘additional encouragement’” of penalty liability in cases where it was
220
“‘not necessary’” and could in fact subvert state regulatory policies.
In addition to these controlling statements by New York’s highest
court, which define section 901(b) as an integral component of the
221
state’s policies on penalty liability, the structure and operation of
the statute also reflect its focus on New York liability law. The law requires that any “statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum
measure of recovery specifically authorize[] the recovery thereof in a
222
In so
class action” in order for aggregate liability to be available.
doing, section 901(b) creates a point of reference—express statutory
authorization for aggregate penalty liability—to which no other legislature (state or federal) would have reason to be attentive. Why would
New Jersey, Montana, or the United States Congress have any occasion
to include such an express authorization in their penalty statutes,
since their law contains no general limitation on the availability of pe-

217

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b).
Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007).
219
Id.
220
Id. (quoting Sponsor’s Mem., Bill Jacket, L.1975, ch. 207).
221
Cf. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1985) (authoritatively defining New York’s law abrogating charitable immunity as a “lossdistribution rule” applicable only to New York residents and entities, not a conductregulating provision applicable to harm carried out on New York soil, and hence inapplicable to out-of-state litigants).
222
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b).
218
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223

nalties on an aggregate basis? As Justice Ginsburg aptly observes in
describing the policies that the statute addresses,
The limitation was not designed with the fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind. Indeed, suits seeking statutory damages are arguably best
suited to the class device because individual proof of actual damages is unnecessary. New York’s decision instead to block class-action proceedings
for statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except as a means to a
manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties—remedies the
224
New York Legislature created with individual suits in mind.

The New York Court of Appeals relied upon these precepts in concluding that the state’s antitrust law, which was amended to include
treble damages shortly after section 901(b) was enacted but did not
include express authorization for a class action, must be read in light
of section 901(b) to disallow recovery of those treble damages on an
225
The court even made clear that it would not be
aggregate basis.
guided by federal antitrust precedents on the proper characterization
of treble damages as a penalty vel non, since section 901(b) indicated
that “‘State policy . . . or the legislative history’” justified “interp226
ret[ing] our statute differently.”
The Connecticut Supreme Court has issued a choice-of-law ruling—apparently without the benefit of Sperry, which was decided four
months earlier but is not cited in the opinion—that arrives at the
same conclusion about the role of section 901(b) in New York’s over227
all liability scheme. In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, a New York resident brought a putative class action in the state courts of Connecticut
against a corporation headquartered in New York, alleging violations
228
That
of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
unusual federal statute provides a penalty remedy of five hundred dol223

The opposite rule of construction applies to federal statutes, which are generally
assumed to be enforceable through a class proceeding unless Congress clearly signals a
contrary intent. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979) (“We do not find in
§ 205(g) the necessary clear expression of congressional intent to exempt actions
brought under that statute from the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
224
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225
See Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015-17 (N.Y. 2007).
226
Id. at 1018 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539 (N.Y.
1988)). The omitted text includes “‘differences in the statutory language’” as a basis
for divergences of interpretation between the state and federal antitrust laws, id., a factor that was not pertinent to the question with which the court was grappling.
227
924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
228
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006).
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lars (with the possibility of treble damages) for every unsolicited fax
that a defendant sends to an unwilling recipient, but only when the
cause of action is “otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of
229
a State.” The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the TCPA to
require a determination as to whether the applicable “state substantive
law” recognizes the action, and it concluded that Connecticut choice230
of-law rules called for the application of New York tort law. Section
901(b), the court concluded, was a part of that liability regime:
“While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural
law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” It is clear that § 901(b) is substantive because it abridges the rights of individuals to bring class action
claims in New York state. We have determined that statutes, like
§ 901(b), that affect an individual’s cause of action clearly are substan231
tive in nature.

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s reasoning is not as precise here as
one might like, but its conclusion is sound: section 901(b) defines the
scope of penalty liability under New York law, not merely the mechanisms available to enforce an aggregate proceeding.
Because the New York legislature chose to effectuate this shift in
liability policy “in wholesale, rather than retail, fashion,” as Justice
232
Ginsburg puts it —i.e., through a single provision of the Civil Prac233
tice Law and Rules that iterates throughout all New York law, rather
229

Id. § (b)(3).
Weber, 924 A.2d at 825-28.
231
Id. at 827 (quoting D’Eramo v. Smith, 872 A.2d 408, 416 (Conn. 2005)). This
ruling drew in part on a string of cases deciding the related but distinct issue of whether section 901(b) controls in actions brought under the TCPA in federal court. Every
district court to confront that question appears to have answered in the affirmative. See
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 & n.4 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the treatment of section 901(b) in TCPA litigation and collecting authorities).
232
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466.
233
We have noted the irony arising from reliance on New York sources in explanations of the limitations on court rulemaking in predecessor bills to the Enabling Act. See
supra note 55. To the extent that New York’s mode of allocating lawmaking responsibility and organizing statutory law contributed to Justice Scalia’s confusion, he would have
benefited from reading a published speech that the Chair of the original Advisory
Committee gave to the New York State Bar Association in 1938. Having quoted the
second sentence of the Enabling Act, William D. Mitchell observed that “[t]he present
New York Civil Practice Act contains some chapters, such as the statute of limitations,
which obviously do not belong in rules of procedure, but in addition to that, many of
the procedural sections are interspersed with provisions affecting substantive rights.”
William D. Mitchell, Reform in Judicial Procedure, 24 A.B.A. J. 197, 199 (1938).
230
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than amendments to the same effect in each New York statute prescribing minimum damages or a penalty—the question does arise
whether the courts of New York would also apply section 901(b) in a
multistate case governed by the law of another jurisdiction. The better answer is that they should not. As noted above, other jurisdictions
would have no reason to include an express authorization for classwide liability in their penalty statutes, and it would create a mismatch
that might well improperly foreclose aggregate relief if a New York
court applied the disqualification of section 901(b) to out-of-state
234
causes of action. But the courts of New York could come to a differ235
ent conclusion without undermining what is set forth above.
Following Shady Grove, one might well ask how a state should proceed when it wishes to protect its industries from the possibility of
crushing aggregate penalties while still providing remedies that will
induce individual enforcement. One solution may be to insert cumbersome amendments into each and every penalty statute in the state
code that make clear that aggregate liability is unavailable. The majority opinion, however, leaves some doubt as to whether even that
step would be sufficient to withstand the overwhelming force that it
ascribes to Rule 23’s language that a class action “may be maintained”
234

Thus, insofar as courts have found that section 901(b) prohibits recovery under the TCPA, we should understand that result to rest upon an assessment of the
limits of classwide penalty liability under New York law, rather than the failure of the
TCPA to include its own express authorization for classwide relief—a subtle but important distinction.
235
The New York legislature could decide—or have imputed to it the decision—
that it will employ a precautionary principle in classwide out-of-state penalty actions,
declining to make the courts of New York available for their enforcement unless the
relevant legislature, like the New York legislature, has explicitly provided that classwide
penalty liability is permissible. Given the potential for the class action to magnify penalty liability to a crippling degree, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Classwide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872,
1882-88 (2006) (discussing the potential distortions of liability policy the class action
introduces in penalty cases under the label “the addition effect”), such a precautionary
principle would not be irrational or improper, provided that it operated as a forum
non conveniens doctrine and did not purport to entail preclusive consequences. Cf.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 200-02 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.)
(framing the public-policy exception in choice of law as a matter of “declining jurisdiction” over a transitory cause of action that could still be enforced elsewhere). The New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules does sometimes employ devices that do this kind of
double duty, as the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized. See Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418, 426 (1996) (noting that section 5501(c)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which allows state appeals courts “to review the size of jury verdicts,” is both “substantive” and “procedural”). Still, there is no
evidence of which we are aware that the New York legislature had such a dual purpose
in mind in this instance.
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236

if the prerequisites of the Rule are satisfied. As Justice Ginsburg observed, the majority opinion might be read to suggest that a statute
prescribing that “no more than $1,000,000 may be recovered in a class
action” might be both sufficient and necessary to achieve this goal,
since it is formally presented as a cap on damages, rather than a state237
ment about what class actions “may be maintained.” If so, then Shady
Grove will stand as a monument to the collateral damage that results
238
when single-minded formalism crowds out sensible pragmatism.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason to believe that the drafters and promulgators
of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 anticipated the potentially destructive
relationship between the damages class action and the creation of statutory penalties. The New York legislature had the benefit of almost
ten years of practice under the newly unleashed power of the Federal
Rule 23(b)(3) class action when they decided to circumscribe New
York’s statutory scheme of penalty and statutory-damages liability as a
239
Having opted
condition of adopting that tool in their own courts.
to pursue class action reform on a transsubstantive basis, but armed
with knowledge of its dangers, the New York legislature enacted an
236

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464-65, 468 n.12 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (valorizing the formal distinction between a “rule of law” and a “rule of review” in arguing that Rule 59 should displace the underlying law in determining when
a jury award is excessive).
237
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238
See also Wolff, supra note 203 (discussing the perverse impact that misplaced
textualism had upon the law of original federal jurisdiction in City of Chicago v. Internatioal College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)).
239
Writing in the same year that the New York legislature enacted section 901(b),
Professor Cover noted that truth-in-lending cases were “the single significant exception” to the failure of federal courts to “analyze[] class action cases as presenting problematic questions of substantive law.” Cover, supra note 147, at 734. Moreover, having
suggested as a cause the fact that “the $100 minimum recovery per violation can be
and has been read as inconsistent with the multiplier effect of 23(b)(3) class actions,”
Cover referred to “the significant opinions of Judge Marvin Frankel in Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).” Id. at 734 n.43. In that case,
Judge Frankel denied certification, concluding that “allowance of this as a class action
is essentially inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress and employed
by plaintiff in this case.” Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416. It is no surprise that Ratner was invoked by those seeking to bar the use of class actions to recover penalties in New York.
See Memorandum from Sanford H. Bolz, Gen. Counsel, Empire State Chamber of
Commerce (Feb. 14, 1975) (on file with authors) (“Penalties and class actions simply
do not mix. This was proved in Ratner v. Chemical Bank, a case under the Federal
Rules, where the combination caused a potential liability of $130,000,000 although the
actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero!”).
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equilibrating provision that sought to prevent harm in categories of
cases where it could be anticipated. We should neither expect prescience from the drafters of the Federal Rules nor adopt an interpretive methodology that treats open-ended text like a fractal that somehow already contains endless levels of determinate meaning when
240
Rather, we should build upon
unanticipated problems first arise.
the insight of Professor Cover, which sadly has lain largely dormant
since he first offered it:
[T]here is a way of reading the Enabling Act which neither renders it a
dead letter, as courts have tended to do, nor construes it as a bulwark
against change. Such a reading would start with the premise . . . that
absent a trans-substantive structure of rules, courts must often justify
decisions about procedure with a combination of substantive and procedural objectives and values. The Rules Enabling Act might then be
read to mean that the courts, in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any subsequently enacted similar body of rules, may not forsake their responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substantive values. It would not be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have
241
to justify invoking it.

Cover’s wise counsel applies with equal force in cases where transsubstantive rules cannot meaningfully be said to embody any prospective choice at all concerning the situations to which they must be applied. This interpretive dilemma might occur when a new adjudicatory
problem arises that was entirely unforeseen by the rule drafters, or
when the realities of litigation and civil law enforcement have evolved to
such an extent that our understanding of what it means to have legal
rights must necessarily change. In such cases, the Federal Rules require
a more nuanced form of analysis than has previously been applied—
one that (i) recognizes the capacity of the Federal Rules to catalyze innovation in liability policy, (ii) acknowledges the proper role of the judiciary in developing interstitial procedures when the Rules mark out a
terrain without providing clear guideposts, and nonetheless (iii) always
keeps clearly in sight the source of the underlying substantive law and
the limits that Erie and the federal common law process impose on the
federal courts in departing from its controlling precepts.
Justice Ginsburg noted the irony of the Shady Grove decision, considering that it came in a case where federal subject matter jurisdic-

240

“I think [Professor Moore] will agree that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
themselves, ought never to become the categories to which substance must bend.”
Cover, supra note 147, at 740.
241
Id. at 734-35.
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tion depended upon the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).
After all, many of CAFA’s proponents sought to curb perceived overenforcement of state law by expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to
include virtually all economically significant class actions, which an in243
creasingly conservative Rule 23 jurisprudence could then govern.
Despite CAFA’s underlying jurisdictional commitment to combating
perverse overenforcement of state liability, Shady Grove subverted New
York’s shield against the overenforcement of state law penalties or
minimum damages. But that irony should not obscure the underlying
similarity between CAFA and Shady Grove. Both developments have
deprived the states of power to pursue visions of the class action that
differ from the federal vision. CAFA was a product of the democratic
process, however protracted and messy. Shady Grove was not. We are
thus reminded once again of the Supreme Court’s powerful incentive
to impute the Enabling Act’s limitations to the false idol of federalism
values, rather than giving effect to the Act’s purpose as a guardian of
the separation of powers. Only the latter approach offers the promise
of consistent and faithful attention to the intended limits on the
Court’s rulemaking authority.

242

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 was intended to decrease the number of class actions overall).
243
See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1441-47, 1507-09.

